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Introduction
Anthony Downs in his work ”An Economic Theory of Democracy” introduced
a whole new understanding of political processes. This seminal book opened a
brand new path for public choice analysis. Using methods traditional to eco-
nomics, he has shown that political choices can be analyzed in a similar way as
rational consumers’ choices using simple microeconomic axioms. The rational
voter theory has become an useful tool in political economy.
This thesis is a compilation of four papers that analyze diverse aspects of the
rational voter theory and spatial models of political competition. Three of them
deal with a spatial model of parliamentary elections, whereas in the fourth one we
implement the rational voter theory to analyze the impact of direct democracy
on fiscal decisions.
In Chapter 1 we present a comprehensive analysis of the Polish parliamentary
elections in 2007 and the subsequent formation of the coalitional government and
it’s policy choice. On the basis of equilibrium predictions of a model of proba-
bilistic voting with non–spatial characteristics of parties in the utility of voters,
we find that for two parties the Downsian behavior is not likely. Moreover, on the
basis of the rational voter theory we conclude that abstentions had an unequal ef-
fect on the election results of particular parties. The second part of the empirical
study deals with the coalitional behavior, and again we non–Downsian behavior
Introduction
of certain parties. Notions such as the uncovered set and the Schattschneider set
are analyzed in comparison with the pension system reform conducted in 2007–
2009. It turns out that theoretical predictions made with the use of cooperative
game theoretical concepts correspond well to the actual policy choice. The main
conclusion of this chapter is that the rational voter theory and the spatial model
in general are very useful in both predicting the positions of parties in the politi-
cal space, the effect of abstentions, the post–electoral coalition formation as well
as the actual policy choice of a governing coalition.
In Chapter 2 we show how the choice of methodology for the estimation of
party positions impacts the conclusions about equilibrium positions of parties in
a spatial model. We use the same set of voters’ ideal points and two different
methodologies of party positions estimation. We show that, depending on the
choice of the methodology, we should observe either divergence or convergence to
the mean. We conclude that, in order to provide policy predictions, a researcher
must choose carefully the method of implementation of the theory to actual data.
In Chapter 3 we test the impact of campaign finance regulations, introduced
to decrease the influence of special interest groups on parties’ platforms. We
base our predictions on the spatial competition model with non–spatial char-
acteristics of parties and use a cross–country sample of 47 countries. We find
that public funding of parties leads to divergence in platforms from the mean
voter. Moreover, ceilings on individual contributions might cause platforms to
converge. These effects are caused by the impact of differences in the non–spatial
characteristics among the parties, which are affected by the way these are being
financed. We also find unexpected divergence related to a ban on corporate dona-
tions and the public disclosure of income statements. These results are based on
an equilibrium theory and do not allow us to make unexceptional policy recom-
xiv
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mendations. Nevertheless, are a first step towards understanding the mechanism
of how financing schemes may affect platforms of parties.
The final chapter contains an analysis of local referendum on self–imposed
taxation in Poland. In this chapter we use the rational voter theory and it’s
further developments by Romer and Rosenthal (1978). The political economy
literature that deals with directly–democratic decision–making typically finds
that it leads to a more efficient fiscal policy as compared with the case in which
decisions are made by a centralized authority. We provide a detailed description
of a specific direct democracy institution, which is a referendum on self–imposed
taxation in Poland. We provide an example of how the specifics of this legal
institution may lead to undesired results, in particular a lack of improvement in
fiscal decision–making. We find that, on the base of the high costs of initiative and
the low access to information on the side of the public, such a referendum does
not lead to increased voter participation in local decision–making. Moreover, we
find that due to the high costs of initiative, local authorities are given a de facto
monopoly power over the agenda–setting. As a result, the considered referendum
does not lead to a more efficient provision of public service, but serves as a mean
of budget expansion for bureaucrats.
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Chapter 1
Spatial Analysis of the Polish
Parliament 2007-2010
1.1 Introduction
Poland is a very young modern democracy. The first partially free election took
place in 1989, when just 35% of the seats in the Lower House and all the seats
in the Senate were assured to be freely elected. The first entirely free election
was conducted in 1991. Up until 2007 only 7 parliamentary elections have taken
place. Although, historical events still play a major role in determining the
shape of the political competition and its differing ideologies, recent literature
on has shown that Central European party systems develop similarly to Western
Europe and are in many aspects such as volatility or longevity of governments
comparable or even better (see, e.g. Kubat (2010)). The issue of comparison of
Central European democracies with more mature democratic European countries
has recently gained much attention from political science scholars.
Aim of this paper is to verify whether it is possible to apply modern economic
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techniques to the case of Poland, which seems still be developing in terms of legal
rules concerning election as well as in terms of the actual shape of the political
scene (see Kubat (2006) for a further discussion of electoral reforms in Poland).
In particular we want to explore if Poland’s political structures - which are widely
derived from other countries and which use imported constitutional solutions -
would develop in a manner similar to other countries’ historical development.
Moreover, it is often argued that Polish politicians are not yet ’professional’,
as they don’t use modern public relations research and furthermore a political
culture in general is not yet fully established. Use of a Downsian approach can
to some extent verify this hypothesis.
A second motivation for this research was the fact that there is little literature
on this topic. Known applications of the spatial model include Great Britain, the
Netherlands, Israel and Russia. A recent working paper of Schofield et al. (2010a)
introduced spatial approach for the case of Poland. Authors present results of
MNL models with valence applied to elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005. There
are, however significant differences between their and our approach, besides the
obvious fact the we analyze elections in 2007, rather than the previous ones.
First of all, Schofield et al. (2010a) do not directly evaluate party positions, but
use the average of the positions of the voters for each party. This fact has a
major consequences on the estimated parameters, to which we shall return later
on. Second of all, we provide a much deeper analysis of strategic behavior of
parties, which is an important factor for LiD and PSL parties on a basis of post-
electoral behavior and particularly important effect of cohabitation. Third of all,
we also provide a formal argumentation for the fact that results of only a sample
estimation of vote shares are insufficient for predicting electoral results in Poland,
because of the unequal effect of abstentions for each of the parties.
2
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A rare example of game-theoretical approach to modeling coalitional politics
in Poland is Sosnowska (2000), which analyzes pre-election polls before 1997
parliamentary election and for each poll uses Shapley values and modified Shapley
values to predict post-electoral coalition formation.
The aim of this paper is to begin to fill this gap and apply contemporary pub-
lic choice research to an interesting new case. The goal of this work is to prove
whether the theory of spatial competition is suitable for explaining parliamen-
tary elections in Poland. Specifically, two major spatial competition issues and
some auxiliary hypotheses are analyzed. First, we explore whether a multi-party
probabilistic model can be used to model the Polish political scene, in particular
to model the results of the 2007 election. We evaluate a number of models of
spatial competition: a pure probabilistic model, a one, in which we additionally
control for social characteristics of voters and two valence models. First we test
how many spatial dimensions characterize the political competition. Two dimen-
sions are shown to be sufficient to model Poland’s political scene: a one which
can be associated with economic policy and the second that captures religious
concerns and world-view. The pure probabilistic model turns out to be superior
in Poland’s case compared to the one in which we add voters characteristics.
However, neither of these models takes into account the non-spatial characteris-
tics of the competing parties and it is argued that for at least some candidates
non-spatial characteristics should be further researched. That is why we estimate
spatial models with valence. On a basis of it, it is possible to check, with the use
of findings of Schofield (2007) whether parties are in equilibrium positions. We
conclude this section with finding that for one of the analyzed parties, namely
LiD non-Downsian behavior is most probable.
In the second part of the study we address the issue of abstentions, which
3
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are shown to play a major role in explaining discrepancy between theoretical
prediction from spatial models estimated on a basis of only a sample of voters
and actual vote shares of parties obtained in 2007 election. We test diverse
hypothesis on reasons for abstentions and their unequal effect on actual vote
shares of parties, to find support that low turnout indeed had a major influence
on election results.
The third part of the empirical study concentrates on the post-election be-
havior of the parties, as well as on the coalitional bargaining that took place
and its impact on the post-election positioning using various cooperative game-
theoretical concepts. Post-election behavior is also illustrated with a case study of
the pension system reform conducted in 2007-2009. By this we show that simple
cooperative game-theory instruments reasonably well correspond with actually
observed political behavior. It is predicted, both on a basis of pre-election and
post-election policy choices that for some parties, strategic behavior may play a
strong role in choosing their manifested ideal point, whereas for the other parties
the pure Downsian approach adequately explains their observed position.
Section 1.2 is dedicated to empirical analysis of pre–election competition on
a basis of Downsian models. In Section 1.3 we predict equilibrium behavior of
parties with the use of a spatial valence model. In Section 1.4 we address the
issue of unequal effect of abstentions on electoral results. Sections 1.5 and 1.6
comprise analysis of post–electoral behavior of parties exemplified with the case
study of the pension system reform. Section 1.7, followed by appendices conclude
the paper.
4
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1.2 Models of Pre–Election Competition
1.2.1 Data
The data were obtained from the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS - Cen-
trum Badania Opinii Spo lecznej). The research was conducted in 2007 and in-
cludes 1385 individual observations. After excluding observations lacking data,
and those for which respondents did not plan to vote in the election, the sample
was reduced to 579 observations. Respondents were asked questions about their
economic and political concerns, electoral preferences and their own character-
istics. To map the ideological preferences of the voters, seven questions were
asked, each eliciting an opinion about an important social or economic matter.
Respondents were asked to place their answers on a scale between 1 and 7. The
questions are reported in Table 1.1.
Answers to the above questions were then rescaled in such a way that they lie
within a (−1; 1) scale. On a basis of the answers, a factor analysis was conducted
to find the main factors that lie behind the given answers. As expected there
was a strong socio–political factor that describes the attitude of the responder
towards the church. Table 1.2 presents the loadings of each answer.
It may be noted that the first factor may be associated with an economic
state control vs. economic liberalism scale, with a high impact of responses
to questions B, E, F and G. The second factor describes respondents world–
view as conservative or liberal. In the second factor, we find a particularly high
impact of responses to questions C and H, questions that described the views
of the respondent on the role of church and abortion. Apart from the economic
dimension, these world–view questions turned out to be, as predicted, the main
5
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Table 1.1: Questions about political and economic issues
Question Answers
A 1)Crime should be fought toughly, even if it hinders civil
rights
7) Crime should be fought in a way that does not hinder
civil rights
B 1) Unemployment is harmful to the economy and should
be stopped
7) A little unemployment can be profitable for the econ-
omy
C 1) The Catholic Church should be separate from the state
and should not influence politics
7) The Catholic Church should have a major influence
on politics
D 1) Public figures should provide statements as to whether
they collaborated with the People’s Republic of Poland
security apparatus
7) Public figures should not have to provide statements as
to whether they collaborated with the People’s Republic
of Poland security apparatus
E 1) Only select public companies should be privatized
7) As many as possible public companies should be
quickly privatized
F 1) The state should provide high levels of public services,
such as health care and education
7) Citizens should be responsible for providing them-
selves with education, healthcare etc.
G 1) Richer people should pay higher fraction of their in-
come in taxes
7) Everyone should pay the same tax rate, regardless of
income.
H 1) Abortion should be absolutely forbidden
7) Abortion should be allowed without restriction.
I 1) Poland should aim towards the highest possible degree
of integration into the European Union
7) Poland should keep a high degree of autonomy within
the European Union
6
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Table 1.2: Loadings of answers
Factor 1 Factor 2
A 0.252 0.225
B 0.447 –
C 0.107 -0.614
D 0.223 0.245
E 0.409 –
F 0.579 –
G 0.478 –
H 0.224 0.459
I -0.291 –
SS loadings 1.105 0.799
Proportion Var 0.123 0.089
Cumulative Var 0.123 0.212
χ2 – Test p-value=0.0517
Table 1.3: Impact of factors on left/right self–perception.
Left/Right Coef. SE t P > |t| 95 % Conf. Interval
Factor 1** -.358 .158 -2.26 0.024 -.669 -.047
Factor 2** -.345 .149 -2.31 0.022 -.639 -.051
Const.*** 4.745 .206 23.05 0.000 4.34 5.15
Prob > F = 0.0084
Adjusted R2 = 0.016
ideological issue and the deciding factor in shaping Polish politics. χ2 test, which
null hypothesis is that two factors are enough to describe major part, shows that
is hypothesis cannot be rejected. We assume thus in further study that the issue
space is spanned in two dimensions. For a deeper analysis of the latter statement
a regression was conducted which investigated the impact of each ideological
factor on how the voters place their views on the left vs. right scale (1 denoting
left–wing, 7 . right–wing outlook).
Both factors have highly significant impacts on the respondents’ self–perception.
7
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Liberal economic views cause voters to place themselves as left–wing. Similarly,
approval of separating church from state, and support for abortion availability
places respondents on the left side of the political spectrum.
1.2.2 Political Parties and Voters
In the 2007 election, three parties and one parliamentary group were able to
gain seats in the parliament. The names, abbreviations, votes obtained and seats
obtained are presented in the table 1.41. This paper does not include the German
Minority Party which has obtained one or two seats in the parliament since 1991,
and which obtains the great majority of their votes in the south–western part of
Poland. As the national minority representative it is excluded from having to
pass the threshold. Traditionally, the German Minority supports the government
regardless of its political stance.
Table 1.4: Parties in the parliament
Name Abbreviation Votes in % Seats
Platforma Obywatelska (The Civic
Platform)
PO 41.51 209
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Pol-
ish People’s Party)
PSL 8.91 31
Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´ (Law and
Justice)
PIS 32.11 166
Lewica i Demokraci (Left and
Democrats)
LiD 13.15 53
Mniejszos´c´ Niemiecka (German Mi-
nority)
MN 0.20 1
How to evaluate party positions is an important methodological concern for
1Lewica i Demokraci consists of four social–democratic parties: Democratic Left
Alliance (SLD), Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL), Labour Union (UP) and the
Democratic Party (SD)
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political studies. We decided to directly survey party representatives, for we
believe they are experts with regards to their own party’s stances. As mentioned
earlier, we used the same set of questions on political and economic issues as
was presented to the voters. In cases where no answer was given, the missing
values were estimated on the basis of parties’ manifestos, by directly comparing
sentences in them with our questionnaire.
What is even more important, the actual policy choices of parties can be
misunderstood by voters, and the perception of positions may differ from the
actual ones. Since the perception is what voters will take into account in their
electoral choices this might lead to a bias in the results. There is no reason to
believe, that this bias should be in a particular direction in case of the analyzed
parties. We therefore assume that, even if there exists a misperception of voters’
assessment of parties’ positions, it is random and on average should not affect the
results as it will be fully captured by the error term in the probabilistic model.
This work only includes parties that were able to receive seats in Sejm in the
election of 2007. Table 1.5 presents ideological positions of parties.
Table 1.5: Parties’ positions
PO PSL PIS LiD
A 7 7 1 7
B 5 2 1 3
C 1 2 7 1
D 2 2 1 1
E 2 3 2 1
F 3 1 1 1
G 7 1 1 1
H 3 2 1 7
I 1 2 7 1
We used factors’ loadings obtained from the study of voters’ positions to
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transform these, such that they are placed in the same issue space. These will be
used in the construction of the spatial model in the next section.
Density and Spatial Placement of Parties
On a basis of factor loadings, ideological scores were obtained for each voter.
These were combined to give an ideal point for each voter in two policy dimen-
sions. We call the first dimension ”Economic” and the second ”Religious”. The
findings of our factor analysis are in line with less formal political science re-
search on the two dimensional space of competition for Poland, as presented e.g.
in Markowski (2010). The lower value of the economic dimension indicates sup-
port for a higher level of interventionism in the economy. Low levels along the
religious dimension suggest support for secularism, whereas high values mean
support for a high degree of involvement for Catholic values in public life. Based
on location of ideal points, in order to visualize positions of electors we estimated
a two–dimensional kernel density of voters’ positions, with an axis–aligned bi-
variate normal kernel. The graph illustrating the estimated density for the two
factors is presented in Figure 1.1.
The majority of voters are concentrated in the quarter of the ideological space
representing left–wing economic views, therefore supporting high state control
over the economy and a conservative world–view. The latter result suggests that
Catholic values are widely held, and that voters expect the church to play a
strong role in political life. At first glance, parties’ positions presented in Table
1.5 suggest that parties fit into these popular opinions quite well. The scorings
for each party serve as the ideal points for parties’ positions and are used in
further analysis. Figure 1.2 presents parties’ positions estimated on a basis of
factor analysis in comparison with the density of voters’ positions.
10
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Figure 1.1: Density of voters’ positions
From Figure 1.2 it can be at the first glance observed that all the parties
are quite well positioned in the ideological space, and as expected all, except for
LiD are in support for Catholic church values. The peak of the distribution is
occupied by the PSL, which places itself in the center of the economic dimension.
The party on the left of the religiosity scale is the LiD, whereas the other three
competitors are placed in the more conservative part of this ideological space.
The LiD need not compete with other parties for the religious left–wing oriented
voters and should capture the votes of all electors located at the bottom–left
corner of the distribution. The other three parties are almost collinear along the
religiosity scale, and they compete primarily in one dimension – the economic
one.
11
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Figure 1.2: Voters’ and parties’ positions
1.2.3 Models Based on Spatial Theory
The profile of voters’ ideal points (xi)i∈N and the profile of party positions (φj)j∈K
are combined to obtain the distance (in this case a Euclidean norm was calculated)
of each voter from every party, producing an array (δij)
j∈K
i∈N . The voting intentions
of the electors are represented with a matrix (yij)
K
N in which yij = 1 if voter i voted
for party j in the 2007 election and 0 otherwise. Probability matrix representing
probability that i votes for j must be calculated (the realization of which is
obtained by maximum likelihood estimation).
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The pure spatial model The pure spatial theory of electoral competition
assumes:
χij = P (uij > ui1∀1 6= j) = P (ε1 − εj < β(δ2i1 − δ2ij : 1 6= j)) (1.1)
In econometric terms, specification of two pure spatial models is
uij = Xijβ + εij (1.2)
where:
uij – utility of voter i from party j
Xij - vector of characteristics specific to party j with respect to voter i
εij – error term.
The difference between alternative specific multinomial probit and conditional
logit models is the distribution of the error term. In case of the MNP model we
have
εij ∼ N(µ,Σ),
whereas in the MNL specification εij is Type I Extreme Value distributed. The
importance of this difference is the IIA hypothesis. Previous studies of electoral
competition, such as e.g. Schofield et al. (1998) used the MNP approach as they
conjectured the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption of the logit
model might influence the results if alternatives are close. However, recent study
of Dow and Endersby (2004) shows that in reality the difference is insignificant for
the purpose of electoral studies. We assume that concerning the fact that parties
in our case are located reasonably away from each other the IIA assumption
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should not play a major role. Another reason in favor of the MNL approach is
that it, unlike the MNP allows for making equilibrium predictions on a basis of
estimation results. In case of multinomial probit models this constitutes a highly
complex computational task, for which no method has yet been found.
Voter–specific model
uij = aiϕj +Xijβ + εij (1.3)
where:
uij – utility of voter i from party j
ai – vector of characteristics unique to voter i
Xij - vector of characteristics specific to party j with respect to voter i
εij – it can again be Type I Extreme Value distributed (MNL) or normal.
In this specification it is not only the spatial position of parties and voters de-
cisive for electoral choice, but we assume that it may also be a function of various
socio–demographical characteristics of voters. The argumentation for use of the
MNP approach, although it’s high computational complexity is the possibility to
calculate marginal effects of both spatial and non–spatial independent variables,
which provides deeper insight of behavior of parties.
Valence MNL model
uij = λ+Xijβ + εij (1.4)
where:
uij – utility of voter i from party j
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λ – valence of a party i
Xij - vector of characteristics specific to party j with respect to voter i
εij – is Type I Extreme Value distributed.
Constant term in the third specification reflects valence, that is non–spatial
characteristics of parties, such as the perception of the quality of the political
leader, which was first introduced by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000).
Voter–specific valence MNL model
uij = λ+ aiϕj +Xijβ + εij (1.5)
where:
uij – utility of voter i from party j
λ – valence of a party i
ai – vector of characteristics unique to voter i
Xij - vector of characteristics specific to party j with respect to voter i
εij – is Type I Extreme Value distributed.
This most general specification captures both valence as well as voter–specific
features.
1.2.4 Estimation Results
Pure spatial model First the pure spatial model was estimated. Since some
authors argue that independence of irrelevant alternatives might be problematic,
15
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for the purpose of comparison we additionally fitted a pure multinomial probit
model (MNP) using a maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) implemented by the
Geweke–Hajivassiliou–Keane (GHK) algorithm in order to compute the multidi-
mensional integral.
Results of the estimation are presented in Table 1.6. We observe that the
sample vote shares fit quite well with the actual election results, except for the
case of PIS, for which the actual result turned out to be much worse than in
the presented sample. Possible reasons for this are analyzed in the following
subsections.
Table 1.6: The pure MNL model results
Choice Coef.a S.E. z P > |z|
Party
Spatial Distance -.353*** .056 -6.29 0.000
Predicted vote share Sample vote share Actual vote share
PO 40.86 39.64 41.51
PSL 9.31 8.59 8.91
PIS 37.59 39.14 32.11
LiD 12.24 12.6 13.15
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
Table 1.7: The pure MNP model results
Choice Coef.a S.E. z P > |z|
Party
Spatial Distance -.426*** .124 -3.44 0.001
Predicted vote share Sample vote share Actual vote share
PO 40.86 39.64 41.51
PSL 9.31 8.59 8.91
PIS 37.59 39.14 32.11
LiD 12.24 12.6 13.15
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
Voter–specific models Table 1.8 presents description of variables used in the
voter–specific model. Table 1.9 present results obtained from the MNL voter–
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specific model. In addition to the spatial distance, individual characteristics
such as education level, size of town of residence and disposable income act as
independent variables.
Table 1.8: Voter–specific variables
Name
dist Spatial distance
Town Size of town 1 – country
categorical variable
...
6 – city over 500.000 inhabitants
Education Education 1 – incomplete primary education
categorical variable
...
11 – higher education (Master’s degree)
In the first step of voter–specific variables selection we compared diverse spec-
ifications with the use of information criteria, and concluded that the two above
presented should be used in the following regressions.2
Here we will not report full estimation results of the voter–specific MNP
model, which do not differ substantially for the MNL estimates (they can be
found in Table 1.27 in Appendix B. However, it is worthwhile to present marginal
effects calculations obtained from this specification (Table 1.10).
The voter–specific model describes the shape of Polish politics well. For the
two major parties the highest change in voting probability can be associated with
the spatial distance and less with other characteristics. Out of all the candidates,
the spatial distance coefficient is highest for these two parties. The factor that
distinguishes between the electorate of the PO and the PIS is the town size and
education. The electorate of the PO consists of inhabitants of bigger cities with
relatively higher education in comparison with those voting for PIS. These two
2We expected religiosity to play a role in electoral decisions, but it turned out
insignificant in tested specifications. Apparently, religious views ale already fully cap-
tured by ideological positions of voters.
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Table 1.9: The MNL voter–specific model results
Choice Coef.a S.E. z P > |z|
Party
Spatial Distance -.476*** .069 -6.90 0.000
PIS (base alternative)
PO
Town .100** .048 2.08 0.038
Education .056** .026 2.15 0.032
PSL
Town -.433*** .102 -4.23 0.000
Education -.010 .039 -0.27 0.786
LiD
Town .012 .064 0.20 0.842
Education -.081** .037 -2.18 0.029
Predicted vote share Sample vote share Actual vote share
PO 40.86 39.64 41.51
PSL 9.31 8.59 8.91
PIS 37.59 39.14 32.11
LiD 12.24 12.6 13.15
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
factors seem to determine the opinions of voters in the analyzed dimensions, since
the spatial distance term has particularly strong marginal effect for PO and PIS.
Negative coefficient on the town size for PSL is associated with this party being
considered agrarian.
The conclusive observation that can be made is that for the two biggest parties
the marginal effect of spatial distance on voting probability is strong, whereas
for the other two parties it is negligible. The latter parties, as already noted, are
characterized by non–spatial issues that have a greater impact on their results
than their actual spatial positions do. In this sense the ”Downsian” hypothesis
is not particularly important to the case of the LiD and PSL parties, since big
changes in spatial positions lead to only a small loss or gain of votes. With regards
to the PSL, it should be noted that the strongest marginal effect exists against
the PO party, therefore the potential movements of this party in the political
space at most affect the division of votes between the PSL and the PO. As for
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Table 1.10: The voter–specific MNP model – marginal effects
Alternatives
Variable PIS PO PSL LiD
Spatial distance
PIS -.083 .104 .003 .030
PO .080 -.111 .007 1.e-194
PSL .003 .007 -.010 .001
LiD 1.2e-12 2.e-194 3.e-195 -.030
Case variables
Town -.010 .042 -.027 .006
Education -.009 .008 .003 .001
the PO and the PIS, spatial movements lead to big differences in predicted vote
shares. It would therefore be rational for them to position themselves as close
as possible to the equilibrium positions, since losses of votes may outweigh the
potential strategic gain for the purposes of further coalitional bargaining.
The two parties for which strategic behavior is probable in the context of
coalitional bargaining are LiD and PSL. With regards to the PSL it must be
pointed out that members of this party were members of 6 out of 12 cabinets
since 1989, with both left as well as right–wing coalitional partners. In this sense,
the position of this party may be considered suitable for becoming a member of
diverse cabinets. Strategic behavior of the PSL party is therefore highly probable,
combined with the weak marginal effect of spatial distance. We shall return to
this observation in the post–election analysis.
Valence model Third model in question is the spatial valence model, as defined
by Schofield (2007). Results of estimation are reported in Table 1.11.
Voter–specific MNL with valence Table 1.12 shows results of estimation of
the voter–specific MNL model with valence.
On a basis of the MNL model with valence we estimated vote probabilities
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Table 1.11: The MNL valence model results
Choice Coef.a S.E. z P > |z|
Party
Spatial Distance -.471*** .076 -6.18 0.000
PIS (base alternative)
PO
Valence 0.670*** .139 4.79 0.001
PSL
Valence -1.08*** .163 -6.66 0.000
LiD
Valence -.619*** .161 -3.83 0.000
Predicted vote share Sample vote share Actual vote share
PO 40.86 39.64 41.51
PSL 9.31 8.59 8.91
PIS 37.59 39.14 32.11
LiD 12.24 12.6 13.15
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
for each party based on the economic views of the voters. Figures 1.3, 1.4,
1.5 and 1.6 present the vote share functions for all parties3. We may observe
that the probability of voting for the Civic Platform party increases along with
increasing economic liberalism, up to over 0.5 for those supporting the minimal
interventionism. The vote share remains fairly constant along the second spatial
dimension – religiosity – for each of the three parties: PO, PSL and PIS. In fact,
these three candidate parties are almost collinear in this dimension. The religious
dimension should influence the probability of votes going to LiD, which is also
clear from inspection of Figure 1.6. We shall elaborate on the impact of each
policy dimension later on.
In the case of the Law and Justice party (PIS) the probability of voting
increases along with support for state control up to the maximal value of over
0.5. A possible reason for this is that the PIS is considered a populist party, and
3Smoothed vote share functions on a basis of predicted probabilities. Smoothing
with the use of thin spline regression with diverse smoothing parameters λ for clarity
of presentation. Note that the vote share figure for LiD is rotated, in order to better
visualize change in vote share along the religious dimension.
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Table 1.12: The voter specific MNL with valence results
Choice Coef.a S.E. z P > |z|
Party
Spatial Distance -.453*** .077 -5.82 0.000
PIS (base alternative)
PO
Town .109** .053 2.04 0.042
Education .064** .035 1.84 0.066
Valence -.098 .297 -0.33 0.740
PSL
Town -.452*** .116 -3.90 0.000
Education -.020 .055 -0.36 0.716
Valence .063 .387 0.16 0.870
LiD
Town .144* .075 1.92 0.055
Education .038 .049 0.78 0.434
Valence -1.32*** .383 -3.46 0.001
Predicted vote share Sample vote share Actual vote share
PO 40.86 39.64 41.51
PSL 9.31 8.59 8.91
PIS 37.59 39.14 32.11
LiD 12.24 12.6 13.15
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
therefore aims to be perceived as providing a high amount of social benefits. The
probability of voting for the Democratic Left Alliance party (LiD) also slightly
increases in the economic dimension; therefore left–wing oriented voters would
typically vote for this party. Most clear is the effect of support for secular values
on the vote share function for this party. The specificity of the Polish political
scene causes a lack of competition between PIS and LiD. LiD is perceived as
post–communist, no matter what their actual values are, whereas the PIS is
typically associated with traditional values and conservatism. The two parties are
placed on far opposite ends of the religiosity scale. However, what is particularly
important for the case of LiD is that their probability reaches a local maximum
on the liberal end of the economic scale. The latter fact may be associated with
the misperception of the party position described in more detail in the appendix.
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Figure 1.3: Estimates of vote shares for the Civic Platform party (PO)
The major problem in predicting vote shares of parties with the use of a
small sample of voters who actually took part in the 2007 election, is that is does
not account for unequal effect of abstention for electoral results. In case of our
sample, it is clear that vote share, obtained only on a basis of voters who went to
the polls is overestimated for PIS. A major argument one that can help explain
the result is that the 2007 election was a pre–term election after two years of a
coalition formed by the PIS and two minor parties (which did not receive seats
in the parliament after 2007) that eventually resigned as a result of not being
able to successfully govern. The strong impression of disappointment associated
with the PIS after this may have resulted in far lower result than that suggested
by the spatial position of the party, which actually seem to be best fitted to the
ideal points of the voters. We conjecture that voters whose ideologies were well
represented by this party decided to abstain, because there were dissatisfied with
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Figure 1.4: Estimates of vote shares for the Polish People’s Party (PSL)
it’s past performance. We associate this result with potentially uneven effect of
abstentions between the two major parties, and we shall turn back to a more
formal analysis of this effect later on.
Table 1.13: Information criteria
LL AIC BIC
Pure spatial MNL model -784.541 1571.084 1576.833
Pure spatial MNP model -692.892 1397.785 1432.281
Voter–specific MNL model -666.4099 1346.82 1387.065
Valence MNL model -681.8814 1371.763 1394.76
Voter–specific valence MNL model -658.6313 1337.263 1394.756
On a basis of the AIC information criterion we choose the voter–specific MNL
model for the purpose of further analysis. Value of the Schwarz criterion is
slightly higher, for it punishes the voter–specific valence model for low increase in
likelihood compared to voter–specific pure model and at the same time substantial
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Figure 1.5: Estimates of vote shares for the Law and Justice party (PIS)
loss in degrees of freedom. Including valence allows us to make use of findings
of Lin et al. (1999) and Schofield (2007) to make predictions about equilibrium
positions. Moreover it seems to be a more valid description for the analyzed
case, because of already mentioned negative popular image of the PIS party and
post–communist view associated with LiD (described in more detail in Appendix
1)
As noted already in the introduction, Schofield et al. (2010a) uses mean elec-
toral preferences as estimates of parties’ positions. By doing so, the study a
priori underestimates the importance of the error term in the regressions. As a
result, the estimated β coefficient will be biased upwards, that is in the direc-
tion of a more deterministic model. What can be found by comparison of this
work and results of Schofield et al. (2010a), obtained β coefficient differ substan-
tially. Higher β coefficient will result in equilibrium predictions biased towards
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Figure 1.6: Estimates of vote shares for the Left and Democrats (LiD)
the more divergent results. We shall visualize the problem with the use of Figures
1.7 and 1.8, in which we compare actual party positions with means of electoral
preferences from our sample.
First, it is clear form inspection of Figure 1.8 that mean electoral preferences
do not correspond well to parties’ positions used in our study. A particularly
striking observation is the mean preference as well as the shape of empirical
distribution ideologies (as presented in figure 1.7 of voters of LiD. Mean preference
in the religious dimension is located far away from what the party officials state
about their preferences. Non–spatial characteristics of parties seem to play a
major role. This is also intuitively clear from high dispersion of ideal points of
voters for each party (as seen in Figure 1.7). We conclude, on a basis of obtained
coefficients, which are much lower than predictions of Schofield et al. (1998)
that the importance of ideological distance is in reality far lower than predicted
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Figure 1.7: Voters ideologies by electoral choice
by Schofield et al. (2010a), under the assumption that voters’ ideologies in the
dimensions have not changed dramatically in the period between two elections.
1.3 Predictions from the Valence Model
Our choice to concentrate on the valence model is motivated by the possibility of
application of results of Schofield (2007) to find a theoretical equilibrium of the
model. Let us briefly restate the assumptions and findings of Schofield (2007).
Each of the parties, in the set P = {1, . . . , j, . . . , p} chooses a policy, zj ∈ X, to
declare to the electorate prior to the election, where X is an open convex subset
of Euclidean space, Rw, with w finite. Formally, the utility of voter i is given by
uij = λj − β||xi − zj||2 + εij, (1.6)
where λj is the valence of party j, xi is the ideal point of the voter, zj is the
party policy (declared before the election takes place) and εij is the stochastic
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Figure 1.8: Actual positions and mean preferences of respective electors
error. It is assumed that valences are exogenous and can be ranked, so that
λp > λp−1 > · · · > λ1. The cumulative distribution of the error terms is assumed
to be C2–differentiable, so that the individual probability functions ρij will also
be C2–differentiable in the strategies zj and the vote shares Vj defined as
Vj(z) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
ρij(z) (1.7)
are also C2–differentiable, in which n denotes the cardinality of the set of voters
N . The mean voter theorem of Lin et al. (1999) shows that the joint mean vector
z∗ = (x∗, . . . , x∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the situation of zero valence. This result
relies on the assumption of the concavity of vote share functions, which cannot
in general be assured. Schofield (2007) defines a weaker equilibrium concept – a
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local Nash equilibrium (LSNE) defined below.
Definition 1 A strategy vector z∗ is a Local Strict Nash Equilibrium iff, for each
agent j ∈ P , there exists a neighborhood Xj of z∗j in X such that
Vj(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
j , . . . , z
∗
p) > Vj(z
∗
1 , . . . , zj, . . . , z
∗
p) for all zj ∈ Xj − {z∗j }. (1.8)
In can be already seen that this definition does not rely on the global concavity
of voters’ probabilities functions, but the LSNE is defined as local maximum of
the vote function given positions of all other parties. In a similar manner a local
Nash equilibrium (LNE) is defined:
Definition 2 A strategy vector z∗ is a Local Nash Equilibrium iff, for each agent
j ∈ P , there exists a neighborhood Xj of z∗j in X such that
Vj(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
j , . . . , z
∗
p) ≥ Vj(z∗1 , . . . , zj, . . . , z∗p) for all zj ∈ Xj. (1.9)
Obviously by definitions 1 and 2 if z∗ is a LSNE, it is also a LNE. We will
further assume that the joint distribution of the error term is the Type I extreme
value distribution.
The definition of a LNE as given in 2 does not rely on the global concavity of
voters’ probabilities functions, but the LNE is defined as a local maximum of the
vote share function, given positions of all other parties. The following definitions
are needed to present the main theorem of Schofield (2007)4.
Definition 3 The electoral covariance matrix.
4Additional minor assumptions are necessary to prove the following theorem. Please
refer to Schofield (2007) for details.
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1 The electoral covariance matrix is ∇∗ = 1
n
∇, where ∇ is [(ξs, ξt)]w×w and
ξt = (x1t, x2t, . . . , xnt) ∈ RN is the vector of the t-th coordinates of the set
of n voter ideal points and (·) denotes a scalar product.
2 The total electoral variance is
υ2 ≡
w∑
r=1
υ2r = tr(∇∗), (1.10)
where w is the dimensionality of the issue space.
Definition 4 The convergence coefficient of the valence model.
1 Define
ρj ≡
[
1 +
∑
k 6=j
exp(λk − λj)
]−1
. (1.11)
2 The coefficient Aj for party j is
Aj = β(1− 2ρj). (1.12)
3 The characteristic matrix for party j is
Cj = [2Aj∇∗ − Iw×w] . (1.13)
4 The convergence coefficient of the model is
c = 2β(1− 2ρ1)υ2 = 2A1υ2, (1.14)
where valence is ranked, so that j = 1 denotes the party with the lowest
valence.
29
Chapter 1. Spatial Analysis of the Polish Parliament 2007-2010
For the joint origin to be a LNE the following conditions, as given by Theorem
1, must be met.
Theorem 1 (Schofield, 2007) The joint origin satisfies the first–order necessary
condition the be an LNE for the valence model. The further second–order neces-
sary condition for the joint origin to be an LNE is that every eigenvalue of the
characteristic matrix C1 = [2A1∇∗ − I] is negative.
In the case that X is w–dimensional then the necessary condition for the joint
origin to be a LNE for the valence model is that c < w.
A first–order necessary condition for the joint origin to be a LNE, which
it is always fulfilled whenever valence is determined exogenously is provided in
Schofield (2006). Intuitively an LNE at the joint origin is less likely, the greater
are parameters β, since than the model becomes more ’deterministic’, υ2 and
λp − λ1.
Corollary 1 In the two–dimensional case, a sufficient condition for the joint
origin to be an LNE for the valence model is that c < 1.
In the two dimensional case, an interesting case is when voters’ ideologies are
weakly correlated in the issues, and so the electoral covariance (υ1, υ2) is 0 or
close to 0 and the two dimensions can be treated separately. In this case we have
two necessary conditions, one for each dimension:
2β(1− ρ1)υ2t ≤ 1 (1.15)
for t = 1, 2 for z∗0 to be an LNE.
Previous formal analyses of the stochastic vote model Banks and Duggan
(2005) and McKelvey and Patty (2006) have focused on conditions sufficient for
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the mean vector to be a Nash equilibrium. As already noted this has involved
assuming that the vote share functions are concave. Obviously, if the necessary
condition given in Theorem 1 fails at the joint origin, then so must concavity.
This casts doubt on the existence of Nash equilibria in these vote models. The
natural question is whether there can be multiple local strict Nash equilibria, but
no Nash equilibria. Schofield (2001) shows generic existence of LSNE as long as
a certain boundary condition is satisfied. This suggests that, in general, there
will exist many different, non–convergent LSNE.
We now turn to the empirical analysis of above quoted findings for the case of
Polish parliament 2007-2010. Referring back to table 1.12 we find that the lowest
valence party is LiD and that the β coefficient equals 0.453. Covariance matrix
of voters’ position is given in (1.3).
∇∗0 =
0.983 0.071
0.071 0.351

The characteristic matrix for the LiD party is
ρLiD =
1
1 + exp(1.32) + exp(1.32 + 0.098) + exp(1.32− 0.063) ' 0.08
and
CLiD = (2 · 0.453 · (1− 2 · 0.08))
0.983 0.071
0.071 0.351
− I =
−0.255 −0.053
−0.053 −0.734
 .
The eigenvalues of the CLiD matrix are equal −0.249 and −0.740 for the
economic and religious dimension respectively. The corresponding eigenvectors
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are
−0.994
−0.109
 and
−0.109
0.994
. The positions of voters and parties, as visualized
in figures, are presented after a varimax rotation of the factor loadings, thus it
is not surprising that the eigenvectors are almost parallel to the economic and
religious dimension axes.
We first tested for whether a covariance matrix is diagonal. χ2(1) test value
of 34.58 shows that the diagonality hypothesis has to be rejected at 1% level.
For this case as noted by Schofield (2007) by a transformation of coordinates,
we can choose respective variances in each dimension to be the eigenvalues of
the Hessian matrix for agent with the smallest valence, and let these be the new
’principal components’ of the electoral covariance matrix. We shall call the prin-
cipal electoral axis, the eigenspace corresponding to the eigenvalue with higher
absolute value, so in other words with higher variance of the transformed issue
space, whereas the perpendicular axis will be called a minor electoral axis. In
order to visualize these results, we present in Figure 1.9 density of voters posi-
tions, positions of parties and electoral axes crossing the mean of the distribution
of preferences. The blue line corresponds to the main electoral axis along the
economic dimension and red is the orthogonal minor axis. Both eigenvalues are
negative which means that, if all other parties stay at the electoral origin, than
the joint origin fulfills the necessary condition to be a LSNE for the analyzed
model. In order to check the sufficient condition we calculate the total electoral
variance and the convergence coefficient as follows:
c = 2β(1− 2ρ1)υ2 = 2β(1− 2ρ1)trace(∇∗) = 2 ∗ 0.38 ∗ 1.33 = 1.01 > 1
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Value of the convergence coefficient is slightly over 1, indicating that the
sufficient condition for convergence is not fulfilled, though this might be a result
of computational inaccuracy. It is related to high variance of preferences in
the economic dimension, and what follows only a very weakly concave vote share
function (the eigenvalue equals −0.249). Although this fact does not sensu stricto
preclude convergence to the joint origin, when we recall vote share functions
shape, we must conclude that it is unlikely along the axis associated with the
economic dimension.
Figure 1.9: Density of voters’ positions, parties locations and electoral axes
Along both axes the gradient of parties’ probability functions points towards
the joint origin. However, as can be already inferred from the shape of the
distribution of preferences, which are more dispersed in the economic dimension,
and also from the absolute values of eigenvalues of the characteristic matrix,
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along the blue axis the convergence is weaker. High concavity of the vote share
functions aligned with the minor axis implies that parties should be located close
to or at the major electoral axis. This is the case for three parties – PO, PSL and
PIS, whereas the lowest valence party – LiD is located far away from the major
axis. What can be inferred from the conditions provided by Schofield (2007),
we should have that the lowest valence party in the local equilibrium is located
closest to the origin and higher valence parties move further away from the joint
origin.
Figure 1.10: Density of voters’ positions, parties locations and electoral axes –
close-up and projections
Figure 1.10 presents a projection of parties’ positions on the electoral axes.
LiD (dark red), as expected remains close to the joint origin along the major
electoral axis. Other parties’ valences are almost equal (for PO and PSL these
were not significantly different from zero) so in the local equilibrium they should
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be located in more or less equal distances from the joint origin. Along the second
electoral axis convergence is strong for three parties: PSL, PIS and PO, who place
themselves very close to the position of the mean religious ideology. The case of
LiD, considering the historical context (presented in more detail in Section 1.2 and
appendix 1) is not surprising. The lack of convergence in the religious dimension
is an understandable consequence of being policy–oriented in this dimension. This
result (together with the analysis of post–electoral behavior in Section 1.5) leads
us to the conclusion that LiD is not a vote–maximizing party in the religious
dimension of competition.
1.4 The Problem of Abstentions
Voter turn-out in the election of 2007 barely exceeded 50% (53.88%).
There are three potential explanations for the low turnout directly arising
from the original spatial voting theory. These are alienation, indifference and
differences in the cost of voting among groups of voters. The fourth hypothesis
is the impact of non–spatial characteristics of the parties, which is not directly
included in the pure spatial model. We shall test each of these hypotheses in
turn, noting that they are not necessarily contradictory.
We test hypotheses of non–spatial characteristics of the parties and the im-
pact of the cost of voting on turnout in one specification. As already noted, we
observe the electoral choices only for individuals that planned to take part in the
upcoming election. The ideological positions are, however observed for the whole
sample. To solve this problem, we proceed in the following way. On a basis of
a valence voter–specific spatial model we make probability predictions for the
out–of–sample observations. If we assume that the voter–specific valence model
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generates the electoral choices of voters in the whole population, these out–of–
sample predictions will be unbiased. Table 1.14 presents summary statistics of
the vote shares in the two groups.
Table 1.14: Vote shares for voters and abstainers
Voters Abstainers Equality of means t-Test
PIS 39.71 44.73 -4.68a
PO 39.00 32.28 3.54b
PSL 8.85 11.14 -4.18c
LiD 12.43 11.83 1.80
No. Obs. 579 259
aRejection at 1% level against the alternative that more voters of PIS are is the abstainers group
bRejection at 1% level against the alternative that more voters of PO are is the voters group
cRejection at 1% level against the alternative that more voters of PSL are is the abstainers group
The main problem connected with voter abstention is how it actually influ-
ences the results of the election. We observed that the probability obtained from
the spatial model for the Law and Justice party differs substantially from their
actual result. If abstentions had on average the same effect for every party, this
would not cause the results to differ between the whole population and the sample
that actually voted and this was not true in the 2007 election.
According to the CBOS report on identification (CBOS Report BS/34/2007)
the PO party is perceived by 40% of voters, and the PIS party by 39% of voters,
as ”best representing their (voter) interests” These two parties are the only ones
that are more often than not perceived as well representing the opinions of voters.
However, PO is characterized with a positive average of grades, whereas PIS has a
negative average, meaning that for the case of PO we may state that the strength
of their support is higher than that of their opponents, whereas in the case of
PIS the relation is the opposite. Therefore, we may predict that among the 50%
of people who actually go and place their ballot, the fraction of PO–supporters
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would be higher. Moreover the fraction of PIS opponents has increased by 12
percentage points since 2005, again supporting the hypothesis that this party has
disappointed the public with their poor performance in the governing coalition
during the 2 years prior to the election. These voters may have augmented the
group that refused to take part in the election. This fact may contribute to
understanding the lack of correspondence between predicted probabilities and
the actual ones.
We shall now test this hypothesis in a formal way. As expected, the t-Test
results presented in Table 1.14 show that the hypothesis of equal vote shares for
PO, PIS and PSL between voters and abstainers has to be rejected. For LiD the
difference is not statistically significant.
In the second step we run a logit regression of the abstention decision with
the probabilities, which we obtained in the first step as explanatory variables.
Since voting for particular parties has been also related to the size of town,
we add interaction terms between the probabilities and each level of town size
(we report the full results in appendix 2). In the same specification we also
include various turnout determinants arising from the rational voter hypothesis
and the subsequent literature. The average level of income as well as the level
of education has been found to affect turnout at the polls. Aldrich (1997) states
that better educated and wealthier citizens are more likely to vote since they pay
more attention to local as well as national politics and this decreases their cost of
gathering information about positions of parties. In this, internet access should
also affect the cost of information, so we add a dummy equaling 1 whenever
an individual declared she is using internet resources. The impact of age on
the probability of going to the polls is a well–established fact in the political
science literature (see, e.g. Topf (1995)), and that the relationship is non–linear,
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reaching a peak for middle–aged individuals. We control for this by adding age
and age squared variables to the regression. Moreover, we add potential effects of
sex, religiosity and labor union membership as conjectured in various studies of
turnout to impact the voting behavior. Individuals in the analyzed survey have
also answered two questions directly related to turnout:
1 How would you describe your general level of interest in politics? (in a 1–7
scale, where 1 denotes high interest for politics)
2 Does it make sense to go voting for influencing political outcomes? (1–7
scale; 1 – Voting does not make sense because it does not change anything,
7 – How people vote has a big impact on whether situation of country will
change for the better)
These variables together with a dummy variable indicating whether an in-
dividual took part in 2005 elections shall reflect the general level of interest in
politics. Full estimation results are presented in Table 1.20, which can be found
in Appendix B. The most interesting variable for the unequal effect of abstentions
is the one which identifies voter as a potential elector of PIS. Being classified as
the elector of the Law and Justice party significantly decreases the probability
of going to the polls. Table 1.15 shows the marginal effect and the elasticity for
this variable.
Table 1.15: Average marginal effect and elasticity – electors of PIS
Coeff. Std. Err. z.Stat.
dy/dx -1.5785** 0.732 (-2.15)
d(log(y))/d(log(x)) -1.2436** 0.591 (-2.10)
Increase in probability of voting for PIS by 1% is associated with decrease in
the probability of going to the polls by 1.58%. The level of education, associated
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in the literature with decreasing cost of voting, positively affects (at 5% level) the
probability of voting. Age and squared age have respectively positive and negative
signs, what confirms the inverted U–relationship between age and voting found
in turnout studies. Among other significant variables we found that the voting
probability is higher for male population and that the general interest in politics
and fact that a voter took part in the 2005 elections also positively affect turnout.
The Effect of the town size, which could also be associated with the cost of voting
disappeared when we added interaction terms between probabilities of voting for
a particular party and the town size. From this fact we conclude that town size
effect is not associated with the cost of voting. On the other hand we identified a
significant positive effect of education level on turnout. This confirms that there
are indeed differences in the cost of voting among analyzed voters.
Alienation occurs when voters find that no party satisfies their ideological
beliefs. In formal terms, individuals vote only if
|Ui(P ∗)− Ui(Pj)| < δi, (1.16)
where δi is a voter–specific positive constant. In other words, voter decides to
abstain if there exists no party which ideal point would lie close enough to his
own preferences. If we assume that other characteristics of voters and parties are
random, that is are on average equally distributed along the analyzed sample,
alienation should be reflected by the average distance of voters’ bliss points to
parties’ ideals. More precisely if the average distance to the closest party is higher
for abstainers than for those who voted, it will be an indication of the alienation
hypothesis. Graphically this should be indicated by abstainers’ ideal points lying
in the outer regions of the preferences’ distribution. Figure 1.11 presents location
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of voters and abstainers in the issue space. Visual inspection of the graph suggests
that abstainers are located unevenly, but there is no visual evidence for them to
be located far from the center of the distribution.
Figure 1.11: Distribution of ideal points of voters and abstainers
According to a 2007 CBOS study, only 33% of Poles believe that among the
competing parties there is one that represents their opinions well(CBOS Report
BS/73/2007). The first impression that strikes one is that, according to the
estimated voter positions (seen in Figure 1.2) three of the parties, that is the PO,
the PSL and the PIS, place themselves in good positions that cover the area with
the highest density of voters, so that one might think that this would preclude
voter abstention.
We now turn to more formal test of the alienation hypothesis. We test whether
on average voters in the abstainers group are those located farther away from
locations of parties. The variable, which is being tested is the mean distance
of the voter’s ideal point to the spatial location of the party closest to him. We
shall test the differences in distance separately for voters in each education group,
40
Chapter 1. Spatial Analysis of the Polish Parliament 2007-2010
due to the differences in the cost of voting as identified in the results above. Full
results are reported in Appendix B. In Table 1.16 we focus on the most important
findings.
Table 1.16: Average distance to the closest party – t-Test Results
Group No. Obs Hypothesis
Education=1,2 and 3 151 H0
a
Education=4 208 H1**
bc
Education=5 and 6 91 H0
Education=7 201 H0
Education= 8 and 9 49 H0
Education=10 42 H1**
Education=11 96 H1*
aNull hypothesis of equality of means
bAlternative hypothesis in favor of alienation
cSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
Results reported in Table 1.16 are not in favor of the alienation hypothesis for
the whole sample of voters. The hypothesis of equality of means in the two groups
is rejected for voters in three education groups, among which in two groups at
5% level in favor of the alternative that the mean distance to the closest party
is higher in the abstainers group. Alienation is significant for the group of voters
with low education level (group 4), who constitute a big share of the tested
voters, and these individuals are also associated with higher probability of voting
for PIS, as predicted by the spatial model. This result confirms the cited findings
of CBOS report, that electors of PIS feel more alienated.
Indifference means that parties are so close in terms of the ideology, so that
the utility gain of having a most desired outcome over the alternatives does not
exceed the cost of voting. In formal terms in a multiparty setting, a voter will
abstain if
|Ui(Pmax)− Ui(Pmin)| < ei, (1.17)
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where by Pmax we denote the closest alternative, Pmin is the worst possible
outcome and ei is a positive constant. In this case, abstention should be on
a part of voters positioned in the center of distribution, with relatively equal
distances to each of the competing party. We shall obtain a confirmation of
the indifference hypothesis if the difference between the utility from the closest
and the farthest alternative is smaller for abstainers. In terms of education level
as determining the cost of voting we proceed similarly to the case of alienation
hypothesis. We report the results of the mean comparison test in Table 1.17.
Table 1.17: Indifference hypothesis – t-Test Results
Group No. Obs Hypothesis
Education=1 6 H0
a
Education=2 136 H11 ***
bc
Education=3 9 H0
Education=4 208 H0
Education=5 and 6 91 H0
Education=7 201 H1**
Education= 8 and 9 49 H0
Education=10 42 H21 **
d
Education=11 96 H0
aNull hypothesis of equality of means
bSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
cAlternative against the indifference hypothesis.
dAlternative in favor of indifference hypothesis
Only in one group of voters we found support for the indifference hypothesis.
For all the other levels of education, we find no evidence for difference in means.
In some groups, the difference in utility is higher for the abstainers group.
As a conclusion we state that the observed differences in utilities connected
with alienation and indifference might have substantial effect on turnout in the
group of well–educated voters, who are at the same time not in favor of PIS. We
found evidence for alienation in education level 4 (thus, worse educated individ-
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uals, who constitute a big fraction of our sample), which is fully consistent with
the fact that these are by major part electors of PIS and with the cited study
of compatibility of political representation with voters’ preferences. These two
empirical studies are a strong confirmation of the alienation hypothesis associ-
ated particularly strongly with the Law and Justice party, as having a substantial
impact on the unequal effect of abstentions for the major parties.
1.5 Coalitional Behavior
In September 2005 after the parliamentary election was held the previous govern-
ment resigned. The 2005 election was won by the Law and Justice party (PIS),
which had a slight advantage over Civic Platform (PO) Results of the election
in 2005, the number of seats at the beginning and the end of their term of office
and the 2007 results are presented in Table 1.18. Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz from
the PIS was designated Prime Minister and was expected to form a government
within two weeks after the election. His goal was to form a grand coalition of the
PIS and PO, but he did not succeed and until May 2006 his cabinet remained a
minority government.
In May 2006 a coalition of the PIS, SO and LPR parties was formed and
Jaroslaw Kaczynski – the leader of the PIS – became the prime minister. The
SO or Self–Defense party is a left–wing populist party with agrarian roots that
maintains a skeptical attitude towards the European Union. The LPR or League
of Polish Families party is a nationalist ultra–conservative party, which is often
virulently anti–Semitic and associated with neo–Nazi values represented by the
”All-Polish Youth” (an ultra-nationalist youth organization whose former leader
later became the leader of the LPR party). The only link connecting the three
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Table 1.18: Results of the election in 2005, the number of seats at the beginning
and the end of term of office and the results of the 2007 election.
Name Abbreviation Seats 2005 - start Seats - end Seats 2007
Platforma Obywatelska (The Civic
Platform)
PO 133 131 209
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Pol-
ish People’s Party)
PSL 25 27 31
Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´ (Law and
Justice)
PIS 155 150 166
Samoobrona RP (Self-Defense of the
Republic of Poland)
SO 56 41 0
Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of
Polish Families)
LPR 34 29 0
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej
(Democratic Left Alliance) - 2005,
Lewica i Demokraci (Left and
Democrats) - 2007
SLD, LiD 55 55 53
Mniejszos´c´ Niemiecka (German Mi-
nority)a
MN 2 2 1
aThe German Minority party obtains most of their votes in the south–eastern part of the country and as a
minority party it is not obliged to pass the 5% threshold. Traditionally, it supports the government regardless
of its political stance.
parties’ ideologies was their shared skepticism towards the EU and their mutual
inability to make an alliance with any other political force. After a substantial
number of members of these three governing parties left to become un–associated
members or to join other parliamentary parties, the coalition lost its majority
(to a sum of 220), was disbanded in 2007 and new election was held. After the
two lesser coalition parties failed to obtain seats in the current parliament, the
PIS tried to benefit from this fact and moved further along the ideological scale
towards conservative values and a left–wing market view.
In Table 1.19 the sum of seats in April 2010 equals 444 due to the recent
death of 14 deputies. Their mandates are to be replaced with candidates who
received second–largest number of votes in respective lists. Two additional elected
deputies declined to vow affirmation. Poland Plus is a party formed in January
2010 from deputies who crossed the floor from PIS.
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Table 1.19: The number of seats in 2007 and 2010
Name Abbreviation Seats – 2007 Seats – April 2010
Platforma Obywatelska (The Civic
Platform)
PO 209 203
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Pol-
ish People’s Party)
PSL 31 28
Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´ (Law and
Justice)
PIS 166 150
Lewica i Demokraci (Left and
Democrats)
LiD 53 -
Lewica (The Left) Lew - 40
Socjaldemokracja Polska (Social
Democracy of Poland)
SDPL - 4
Stronnictwo Demokratyczne
(Democratic Party)
SD - 3
Polska Plus (Poland Plus) PP - 8
Independents - - 9
Mniejszos´c´ Niemiecka (German Mi-
nority)
MN 1 1
1.5.1 The Political Heart in 2007
Figure 1.12 presents the location of the heart, the uncovered set, the yolk, winset
of the status quo located at the yolk as well as Shapley–Owen power indices of
parties (under simple majority rule). The heart is the triangular–shaped area
bounded by median lines connecting ideal points of PSL, PO and LiD, marked
in the figure with dark–red lines. A green cross–shaped point is the center of
the yolk. Yolk, as defined in McKelvey (1986) is the smallest ball in Rn that
intersects all median hyperplanes. A formal definition of the uncovered set can
be found in McKelvey (1986). Loosely speaking, it can be said that given points
x and y in an issue space and some distribution of ideal points, the point x covers
y if and only if x defeats y, x defeats every point y defeats, and x defeats or ties
every point y ties. The uncovered set consists of all points that are not covered by
any other point. McKelvey (1986) also shows that a circle, centered on the yolk,
but with a radius 4 times larger, bounds the uncovered set. Moreover, if the core
45
Chapter 1. Spatial Analysis of the Polish Parliament 2007-2010
Figure 1.12: The Polish Parliament in 2007 – the uncovered set, the yolk and the
heart
exists in a particular game it coincides with the uncovered set. Boundaries of
the uncovered set are presented with a gray–shaded area in Figure 1.12. Winset
of a status–quo located at the center of the yolk consists of three elliptic–shaped
areas, marked with thick red lines. We may already observe that winset of the
center of the yolk expands beyond boundaries given by median lines, thus it also
covers part of the issue space not located within the heart.
A formal definition of Shapley–Owen power indices can be found in Feld
and Grofman (1990). Here it is enough to say, that Shapley–Owen value of a
particular party is the probability of randomly selecting a line, such that when
all other parties are projected on to the line, the party is a median one. High
Shapley–Owen power index indicates that a particular party remains close to
the political center e.g. defined as a yolk of the coalitional game. Shapley–
Owen values indicate a much higher power of PSL than suggested solely by their
electoral result. This is due to the central location of their ideal point. Given
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their position in both dimensions, PIS does not have any power in parliamentary
voting. Finally, we observe that the core of the game is empty.
In the case of Poland we observe that the heart is the area within the three
median lines crossing the ideal points of the PO, PSL and LiD. We may pre-
dict that the government that forms shall include at least one of these parties.
Traditionally the party that obtains the highest number of seats is designated to
form a coalition, therefore we predict that either a PO/SLD or PO/PSL coalition
will form. Of the two, the PO/PSL coalition is the minimum winning coalition.
In fact it is also the minimal connected winning coalition along the economic
dimension.
The PO and PSL form the actual coalition that has governed Poland since 2007
and this government was able to gain a vote of confidence by a simple major-
ity. It is the one predicted by all the theories cited. However, due to political
situation within years 2007-2010 a simple majority was insufficient to pass bills
vetoed by the president (a more detailed description of constitutional provisions
regarding voting in the parliament is to be found in the appendix), so that in
fact a 3/5 majority was be needed. The party that turned out to support the
governing coalition is the LiD (with whose votes 289 over the necessary 276 votes
can be obtained). Though not formally in the coalition, LiD has turned out to
play a pivotal role when it comes to passing acts, since the presidential veto for
new bills was almost always assured. Therefore, we may predict that political
outcomes that lie not only at the median line for PO and PSL but also in other
parts of the heart shall occur. Figure 1.13 presents 20 randomly drawn proposals
(marked with red crosses), assuming that PO is the agenda setter (which is justi-
fied assumption given that the spokesman of the Sejm is a member of this party)
based solely on positions of parties and power indices. More precisely, we start
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the algorithm at PO’s ideal point and the next proposal to voted on is a random
point chosen form the winset of the previously proposed policy. A substantial
number of proposals falls in the proximity of LiD’s ideal point, which corresponds
well with predictions driven solely from observation of the political rhetoric.
Figure 1.13: Randomly drawn proposals with PO as the agenda setter
1.5.2 Other Solution Concepts
Economic dimension voting behavior Figures 1.14 and 1.15 present the
outcome of one–dimensional deterministic voting on a proposal located at the
point equally distant from PO’s and PSL’s ideal points (marked with a green
cross) under simple majority (Figure 1.14) and the 3/5 majority needed to over-
ride the presidential veto (Figure 1.15). We believe that strong party discipline
present in Polish Sejm allows assuming deterministic voting. The Copeland win-
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Figure 1.14: Voting in the economic dimension
Figure 1.15: Voting in the economic dimension – 3/5 majority
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Figure 1.16: The Schattschneider set
ner (Copeland (1951)), which is a point in the area space with the smallest winset
(or in other words Copeland’s method is a Condorcet method in which the win-
ner is determined by finding the candidate with the most pairwise victories), is
marked with a red point. It can be easily calculated as the weighted average of
parties’ ideal points with weights being Shapley–Owen values. We conclude that
under simple majority rule the Copeland winner along the economic dimension
is located exactly at the ideal point of the PSL party which gives it a very strong
voting power (in terms of the Shapley–Owen index). Whenever the simply ma-
jority is insufficient for passing a bill, and a 3/5 majority is needed (i.e. as a
result of a presidential veto) the Copeland winner is located more to the right of
the economic dimension and voting power is split equally between LiD and PO
1.15. This again confirms the previously mentioned power of the LiD party to
override the veto.
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Voting in both dimensions Figure 1.16 shows the size and location of the
Schattschneider set. A well–known solution concept, which is a dimension–by–
dimension median, has a major drawback, that it is not invariant to linear trans-
formation of voters’ ideal points (see, Shepsle (1979) and Marakulin and Zakharov
(2009)). This means that the outcome of voting on each issue separately may
depend on the voting agenda. This also means, that how one rescales (e.g. by
means of rotating the issues space) the factors used to construct ideal points
of parties, could result in different predictions. Instead of the dimension–by–
dimension median, Feld and Grofman (1988) proposed a solution concept, the
Schattschneider set, which consists of all policies that can in some rotation of
the issue space represent the median in both dimensions. Moreover, Marakulin
and Zakharov (2009) show that a generalized version of the Schattschneider set
(formal definition of can be found in Austen-Smith and Banks (2005)), which
allows for any non–degenerate linear transformations of voters’ ideal points for
the two–dimensional case coincides with the locally uncovered set of the issue
space. We expect the Schattschneider set to be a solution concept, which in a
reliable way describes the possible outcome of voting when bills are proposed
by both coalitional partners and in both dimensions, since it takes into account
the fact that a minor coalitional partner is located centrally, and has a strong
impact on proposed policies, and this strength cannot be easily altered by the
agenda–setter. Figure 1.16 shows that the Schattschneider set is located close to
the PSL’s ideal point, so we expect the bills to be under strong influence of the
minor coalitional partner.
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1.6 Analysis of the Pension System Reform 2007–
2009
1.6.1 Description of the Legislative Process
To compare the findings of the public choice theory as given in Section 1.5 with
the actual policy choices we conducted a case–study of the pension system re-
form. It has been so far the most controversial and one of the most important
bills enacted by the current government. Shortly after the election in 2007, the
government started working on the new law, which would modify the rules by
which individuals employed in certain industries and types of occupations are
allowed to go to early retirement. These occupations include especially difficult
and health harming working conditions (such as in heavy industries) and other
types of occupations, described in the portrayed act as ”of special nature” (air
traffic supervisors, emergency and rescue officers etc.). The early retirement bill
in force in 2007 enclosed a very broad definition of special working conditions
and an extended list of occupations which were entitled to early retirement. The
number of workers entitled summed up to roughly 1.2 million (out of total 9.5
million employed).
The key part of the parliamentary debate as well as the public consultation
was the list of eligible occupations. The government took a position that the list
shall be very restricted, to retrench budgetary spending on this issue. The most
controversial point of the debate has been abridging most school teachers of the
right to go into early retirement. Both opposition parties opted for retaining this
right. This as well as other moot points of the described act were subject to the
public discussion during sittings of the Trilateral Commission for Economic and
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Social Issues consisting of representatives of the government, labor unions and
employers’ associations.
The government proposal of the first draft of the amended bill published in
May 2008 included a list of 50 occupations eligible for early retirement. The
estimated number of entitled individuals was 170,000 employees (Rzeczpospolita
(2008)). During the next months, the list has been elongated and the final draft
accepted on 30th of September 2008 (www.premier.gov.pl (2008)) included the list
of occupations, which did not however contain demands of labor unions stipulated
during sittings of the Trilateral Commission, which ended in a fiasco. The number
of workers entitled rose, however to about 270,000 due to changes in definitions
of certain terms and broadening of age qualification (PAP (2008c)).
A still unresolved problem was the issue of an early retirement possibility for
school–teachers. It has been the most controversial aspect of the proposed bill.
Moreover, it has been particularly important, since by the time the draft was
brought up for parliamentary discussion it was clear that Lewica5 will oppose it
unless it contained more privileges for school–teachers (PAP (2008b)). In a case
of a presidential veto, which was almost assured, coalitional government would
have to comply with the postulates of the Lewica party to ensure support for the
discussed bill.
An additional complication was caused by the fact that the act in force by
the end of 2008 would become void at the beginning of 2009, thus in case a new
law had not been passed all those eligible for early retirement on the basis of
the previous law would have lost their privileges, so the government acted under
huge pressure to complete the preparation of the new act by the end of 2008.
5A direct successor of the LiD, which was disbanded in April 2008, therefore by the
time the analyzed law has been prepared.
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Nevertheless, the prime minister decided to postpone voting on the the law until
the very end of the year, so that if the president had vetoed the new act, political
responsibility for a discontinuity of the law would fell on him.
First reading of the new act was held in the parliament on the 17th of October
2008 with an immediate motion to dismiss it put forward by Lewica and PIS.
According to the press reports on the 20th of October (PAP (2008a)), Lewica
would oppose the presidential veto provided the government agrees to add school–
teachers to the list of occupations, which was however unacceptable for the gov-
erning coalition. After the second reading on the 28th of October a total of 71
amendments were proposed. 44 of these were proposed by Lewica party, 21 of
which concerned adding additional occupations to the list of eligible for early
retirement. Out of these 21 amendments only 3 were accepted by votes of the
governing coalition.
Crucial amendments that were added to the bill after negotiations with Lewica
concerned school–teachers. The government and the opposition party Lewica
agreed to compensate teachers for the lost early retirement entitlement in a form
of raising the initial capital level used to calculate the level of pension (Sejm
(2008a)). The exact formula to calculate the level of the compensation is pro-
vided in the cited document, and it could be estimated as equalling roughly 80%
of what would have been provided in case teachers had been entitled to early
retirement under the new law. Roughly 180,000 employees were qualified for the
compensation payment (out of around 400,000 who had been eligible for early
retirement under the previous act). The bill passed in the Sejm on the 6th of
November, however opposition, including Lewica voted against it (Sejm (2008b)).
Several days later the higher chamber of the Polish Parliament also accepted the
new law, without additional amendments.
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On the 15th of December, the president decided to veto the bill. At first
Lewica stated that it would vote to support the veto, so it became clear that
definite shape of the bill is still subject to negotiations. Lewica again demanded
early retirement for school–teachers and further expanding the catalogue of oc-
cupations eligible. It also threatened the coalition with bringing the bill before
the Constitutional Court, which would further delay the legislative process. Fi-
nally, the coalition gave consent to a proposal of raising the compensation for
school–teachers to a value of 100% the prospective early pension, without adding
any new occupations to the list. In other words, it in practice agreed to provide
school–teachers with pensions of the same amount as scheduled under the early
retirement scheme. The presidential veto was overruled on the 20th of December
2008, by votes of PO, PSL and Lewica (a total of 285 over required 267 votes)
and on the 18th of March 2009 the Sejm unanimously accepted the amendment
concerning compensation scheme for school–teachers.
It is not possible to precisely determine the ideal points of each coalitional
partner in the particular case of the early retirement bill, however it is clear that at
least a part of PSL members of parliament opted for enclosing school–teachers in
the list of occupations entitled for early retirement. Minister of Labor and Social
Policy, Jolanta Fedak, a member of PSL announced on the 18th of November
2008, that she will propound a draft of an early retirement bill, which would
include school–teachers. This draft would be proposed as a legislative initiative
of a group of deputies and not of the government. According to announcement
of PO (PO (2008)), government did not take into consideration enclosing school–
teachers in the bill, and that the Prime Minister is ”taken–aback” with this
initiative. These facts let us conclude that PSL’s ideal point on the issue was
located closer to demands of Lewica and labor unions that to it’s coalitional
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Figure 1.17: Voting on a proposal located at the Lewica’s ideal point
partner bliss point.
1.6.2 Theoretical Predictions and the Actual Policy
As can be observed in Figure 1.14 any economic proposal located between the
point equally distant from PO’s and PSL’s ideal points and the ideal point of
Lewica should receive support of roughly 243-265 votes, which is enough to pass
the proposed bill under the simple majority rule (in case all MPs were present),
but not under the qualified majority of 3/5, under which assuming the presence
of all members, 276 votes are needed.
It can be seen in Figures 1.17 and 1.18 that for a proposal to gain the majority
required to overrule presidential veto it is necessary that it lies in a close proximity
of the LiD’s ideal point. The process of enaction of the early retirement bill clearly
shows that this theoretical prediction coincide with the actual policy choice. The
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Figure 1.18: Voting on a proposal located at the Lewica’s ideal point – close–up
first draft of the discussed law was a joint work of both coalitional partners and
discussants in the Trilateral Commission, but it is clear that it represented the
view of the larger party, which at first was reluctant to back down its view of the
shape of the new law. Moreover, as discussed before the Minister of Labor and
Social Policy from PSL tried to ”push through” her version of the early retirement
bill despite objections expressed in official statements of the government.
The final version of the law, includes a list of amendments proposed by both
PSL and Lewica, and most importantly it encloses compensation schemes for
school–teachers, size of which equals what this professional group would get, if
it had been included in the discussed legal act. In this, the early retirement bill
almost completely meets demands of Lewica and the labor unions that it repre-
sented. The three important features of the current political situation in Poland
shape process of bills enaction, so that it well reflects theoretical predictions on
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a basis of spatial theory. They are
a cohabitation, which forces the coalitional government to seek support from
one of the opposition parties,
b central location of Lewica’s ideal point along the economic dimension, and
c distribution of seats in the parliament.
A major conclusion from this section is that non–Downsian behavior observed
for LiD in Section 1.3 is again confirmed by it’s post–electoral impact on policy
choice.
1.7 Conclusions
According to Lin et al. (1999) for ”Downsian” parties, if each expected vote
function is concave in each policy dimension, then a strong convergence to the
mean of preferences should be observed. This means that all parties will adopt the
same position, minimizing the distance between their position and voters’ ideal
points. However, Lin et al. (1999) also note that if variances are small, concavity
conditions may fail and different Nash equilibriums can be found where parties
will adopt different policy positions.
On the other hand, a study by Adams (1999) examined the effect of the β
coefficient in an equation determining the utility on the basis of a spatial distance
on Nash equilibrium under vote maximization. His study shows that for values of
β that are close to zero, the Nash equilibrium is strongly convergent and located
at the mean of the voter distribution. For β → ∞ (the greater the value of
β, the more ”deterministic” the model becomes) a Nash equilibrium may not
be possible in a more than one–dimensional policy space. In between there are
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values of the spatial parameter for which a non–convergent equilibrium exists.
Subsequent theorem of Schofield (2007) finds necessary and sufficient conditions
for existence of local Nash equilibria, even if global concavity does not hold.
This paper aimed to determine whether spatial competition models – assum-
ing Downsian behavior of participating political parties – are useful for describing
the positions of political parties in Poland in the period preceding election in 2007
and whether theoretical prediction of spatial theory and cooperative game theory
help predict formation of cabinet and policy choices during the period 2007–2010.
The results are somewhat ambiguous.
We estimated a number of diverse specifications and found a common prob-
lem. Predicted probabilities correspond quite well with the actual results for the
two smaller parties, but the model fails to predict vote shares for the PO and
PIS parties. Observation of marginal effects suggests that pure spatial models
lack some important non–spatial characteristics of Polish political parties. These
may include the afore– mentioned impact of corruption scandals in the case of
the LiD party or, as another example, the public perception of the PSL as a
solely an agrarian party. However, it is very difficult to accurately portray these
characteristics.
The estimated β coefficient for the MNP model equals .426 for the pure spatial
model. Since theory for models with normal errors does not predict what exactly
a small value of the coefficient means it is useful to compare this result with other
studies that estimated pure spatial models. The study by Schofield and Sened
(2005) for Israel predicts a value of coefficient equaling 1.739. For this value, the
authors find two different non–convergent Nash equilibria. However, one must
note that while these equilibria were found with the use of coefficient obtained
from MNP model, the simulation was then conducted with the conditional logit
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assumption, which assumes an independence property (IIA). In the case of close
alternatives this may give incorrect results, but it is much easier to calculate.
Schofield et al. (1998) conducted a study for Germany and the Netherlands using
a multinomial probit. For Germany the estimated coefficient equals 0.239 and
for the Netherlands it is 0.456. In case of both countries, the authors found that
behavior is non–convergent.
A major advantage of using the MNP approach is that it allows for calculation
of marginal effects of particular explanatory variables used in the regressions,
which is not possible for the conditional logit. This gives us a deeper insight
in the potential for strategic behavior of the analyzed parties, and we found
confirmation of it for LiD and PSL.
Further on, we estimated valence models with conditional logit to be able
to compare our empirical findings with theorems of Schofield (2007). We argue
that because of high variance of errors in voters’ behavior and what follows small
value of the β coefficient convergence should be relatively strong, and stronger
than predicted by Schofield et al. (2010a). Again we find confirmation for a
non–Downsian placement of the LiD party. As for LiD, it is observed that it’s
position is very distant from the electoral axis along the religious dimension. Since
no reasonable alternatives exist in the secular part of the political space, it would
be rational for the LiD to move towards the center in order to try to catch votes
of liberal–democratic oriented voters, at least if it did not fear alienation. On
the other hand, the LiD is the party that had the most to gain from coalitional
bargaining. It was clear even before the election that if the PO and the PSL
parties did not obtain at least 3/5 of votes in total, they would need another
partner in order to overrule the presidential veto. The LiD party, who may have
predicted their potentially pivotal role in the forthcoming parliament, could take
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advantage of this position of power. Strategically, this would mean moving away
from the political center in order to increase the size of the heart and to include
in it policy points close to the ideal point of the LiD.
These primary findings are illustrated with the post–electoral coalitional find-
ings and the case study of act on early retirement. Analysis of the actual policy
choice as compared to game–theoretical predictions of locations of the heart,
Copeland winner and Schattschneider sets, shows that strategic behavior of LiD
is most probable. The analysis also confirms that because of the cohabitation
situation in which coalition is forced to seek additional support from Lewica, the
actual policy chosen lies very close to Lewica’s ideal point, as predicted by theo-
retical concepts and what explains non–Downsian positioning that was found.
As already noted, spatial models are not entirely useful in predicting actual
electoral results, because of the low turnout. In order to address this issue we
conducted a formal analysis of turnout determinants to find that potential voters
of PIS did not take part in the 2007 election. In this, we conclude that a strong
sense of disappointment associated with this party could have resulted in lower
valence for PIS, if these electors were included in the analyzed sample.
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1.8 Appendix A
The constitutional system in Poland
Poland is ruled by a parliamentary system of government. The basic formulation
of this type of governing system was first introduced by the French Third Repub-
lic constitution in 1875. The basics of the system in which the executive branch
is designated by the head of state and at the same time must be supported by
the parliament are present, but the Polish parliamentary system reveals some
particular characteristics which make it a bit different from the standard model
and are well worth describing. Poland’s history and its parliamentarianism have
both played a role in shaping these characteristics.
The current governing system in Poland was formed by the constitution of 1997.
This replaced the temporary amendments put into place in 1992, which were
designed to transform Poland from a single- to a multi-party system and from
socialism into a free market economy. It is based on a bicameral parliament .
the National Assembly, whose term of office equals 4 years. The lower chamber
is called the Sejm, whereas the upper chamber is the Senate. The constitution
stipulates the possibilities for extending a term of office in case of an emergency
state, and also details the possibilities for shortening it in certain specific situa-
tions. One such situation is if two-thirds of the Sejm elect to dissolve parliament
(if this happens, then Senate is automatically disbanded). A second situation
that can lead to parliamentary dissolution arises if parliament does not submit
the Budgetary Act for approval by the president within a particular time. The
last enumerated situation is the most important for the purposes of this work.
Parliament may be disbanded if it is unable to form a government or to give a vote
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of confidence to the government proposed by the President. In the latter case,
the constitution foresees and does not permit the possibility of endless coalition
bargaining that could prevent a government from ever forming.
The elections to Sejm can be described by five characteristics: they are uni-
versal suffrage, proportional, equal, direct and anonymous (that is, they are con-
ducted by a secret ballot). Deputies are elected in 41 electoral districts, 7 to 19
members from a closed list in each. The total number of members equals 460. A
d’Hondt formula is currently used to divide the seats. In 1991 the Hare–Niemeyer
formula was used, and in 2001 the modified Saint–Lague method. The latter way
of transforming the number of votes into seats is more proportional and it al-
lows for a close ratio of votes to seats received, whereas the d’Hondt method
encourages larger parties to obtain more seats. Furthermore, the system sets a
particularly high threshold of votes needed for seats: 5% for parties and 8% for
coalitions. One reason for this set-up might be the fragmentation of the Polish
political scene 6, which though diminishing still appears to determine the shape of
Polish governments. This particular characteristic of Polish parliamentarianism
seems to have a big influence on election results. In the upper chamber, senators
are chosen in universal suffrage, direct and proportional elections under relative
majority rule in 40 electoral districts, up to a total of 100 members. It should
be noted that although the parliament is bicameral, the rights of the Senate are
very weak. Among the entitlements relevant to this paper, one needs to only to
note that the Senate may reject or amend the bills passed by the Sejm but any
rejection or amendment may still be overruled by an absolute majority vote in
the Sejm. In this sense, the role of the Senate in forming legislative acts is minor
6In the first free election in 1991, 29 different parties received seats. 11 of these
parties received just one seat.
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and focuses mainly on correcting mistakes in bills enacted by the lower chamber.
The president of Poland is elected in a universal suffrage, direct, equal and
anonymous election. This gives the president an unusually strong mandate not
often encountered in other parliamentary systems across Europe. Among the en-
titlements of the president, one may distinguish between prerogatives and actions
that require a countersign of a competent minister. Among the presidential pre-
rogatives it is important to cite both the right of legal initiative and the right to
veto bills proposed by the parliament, which can be overruled by a 3
5
majority of
Sejm members. The president’s strong public mandate and veto ability can and
does lead to situations where a simple or even absolute majority may be insuffi-
cient to pass a bill, especially in a cohabitation situation, in which the president
(though formally s/he cannot be a member of any party) for all intents and pur-
poses represents the views of the opposition. The president may also convene a
referendum after obtaining the assent of the Senate. One must bear these presi-
dential entitlements in mind in order to properly analyze coalition bargaining in
Poland.
The president designates the executive in a form of a cabinet, but the cabinet
must enjoy the confidence of the Sejm. One constitutional exception to this rule
is when the Sejm chooses ministers, and the members are afterwards appointed
by the president. The latter situation occurs if the Prime Minister designated
by the president is unable to form a government that would receive a vote of
confidence from the Sejm by absolute majority in the presence of at least half of
the representatives. If the second procedure also fails, the right of the indication
of a Prime Minister goes back to the president, and the first step is repeated;
however, a simple majority of votes is sufficient to achieve a vote of confidence.
If after this procedure it is still impossible to form a cabinet, new elections must
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be convened. The coalitional bargaining process has been thus restricted in order
to ensure a continuity of governance. Among its rights the cabinet also holds the
right of initiative.
Formation of the Political Scene in Poland
Before further analysis, it is important to understand how certain historical
events have impacted specific aspects of Polish politics. Trade unions had a
crucial historical influence on governance, especially with regards to the Solidar-
ity movement in Poland’s transition from a single-party authoritarian regime to
a democratic system. This situation, improper from a democratic point of view,
is now overruled by the constitution, which says (Art. 100 §1) that ”Candidates
for Deputies and Senators may be nominated by political parties or voters”, a
contrario not by the trade unions.
Another important feature of Polish politics is a distinction between the left
and the right. Left-wing parties are for the most part against the involvement
of the Catholic Church in Polish politics, and they do not question the accom-
plishments of the People.s Republic of Poland (this was the official name of the
country from 1952 to 1989, when it was ruled by the communist Polish United
Workers Party). On the other hand, the right-wing parties, usually connected
with the Solidarity movement, refer to national traditions, support the Catholic
Church’s involvement in politics, and discard the accomplishments of the previ-
ous regime. Though the described division has become weaker, it still more or
less dictates the shape of Polish politics. However, in the 2007 and 2005 elections
the political competition focused on two right-wing, post-Solidarity parties and
the left or post-communists played a rather minor role.
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Major Political Parties in Poland
Four of the political parties in contemporary Poland were able to obtain seats in
the current parliament:
The Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) - The Civic Platform was
founded in 2001. It mainly consists of liberal ex-members of the Solidarity
Electoral Action party (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnos´c´) and Union for Free-
dom party (Unia Wolnos´ci) which from 1997 to 2001. The Civic Platform
is a Christian-democratic and liberal-conservative political party, combin-
ing liberal stances on the economy with conservative stances on social and
ethical issues, including opposition to abortion, gay marriage and euthana-
sia. Among their main proposals flat tax, fast privatization, decentraliza-
tion and labor law liberalization shall be cited in this study. The party’s
attitude towards the European Union is moderately enthusiastic. In the
European Parliament this party is part of the European People’s Party.
The Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) - Founded
in 1990, it is considered an agrarian centrist party. The name of the party
has a century–old history and it was one of the most important parties in
the 1920–1939 period. However, these days the members of the new Polish
People’s Party come mainly from the ex–communist United People’s Party
which was strongly associated with the old regime. Because of this, prior to
2003 its program was rather left–wing with a focus on agricultural issues.
However, after quitting their coalition with the Democratic Left Alliance
Party they have moved towards the center of the political scene. It cannot
be forgotten that rural areas are one of the main beneficiaries of Poland’s
accession to the European Union. In the European Parliament this party
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is a member of the European People’s Party.
Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwos´c´) – This party was established in
2001 by the Kaczyn´ski brothers; Lech, the President of Poland who died re-
cently, and Jaros law, the current party president. Most of the present party
members were associated with the conservative and socialist parts of the
Solidarity Electoral Action Party. It has built its political strength mostly
through leading a ”crusade” against political corruption. (Previously, Lech
Kaczyn´ski was the Chairmen of the National Control Chamber as well as
the Minister of Justice). The party is considered to be social–national–
conservative. Their platform includes support for state intervention in the
economy, centralization, restricting monetary policy independence, enforc-
ing stronger penalties for criminals, and finally constitutional reform in
order to strengthen the role of the President. It’s attitude to the European
Union is rather skeptical. In the European Parliament they are a member
of the European Conservatives and Reformists.
Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) - The biggest
party of those forming a parliamentary group Left and Democrats (Lewica
i Demokraci; under name Lewica since 2008) consisting also of: Social
Democracy of Poland (SDPL), Labour Union (UP) and the Democratic
Party (PD). A social democratic party. Initially it was a direct descendant
of the communist Polish United Workers. Party - the ruling party from
1948 to 1989. The name was used for a coalition of left–wing parties from
1991 to 1999. It was formally established as a single party on April 15,
1999. In late 2006, it joined the Left and Democratic Parties, an alliance
of center–left social liberal parties. In the early 90’s they abandoned their
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back–to–communism message and switched to supporting social democ-
racy. This party represents a modern social-democratic program modeled
on the Labour Party or SDP. In 2001–2003 the then–governing Prime Min-
ister along with the party’s chairman Leszek Miller implemented market–
oriented reforms which together with numerous corruption scandals ruined
the party’s popular image. However, it has a staunch group of supporters
which can be estimated as comprising 10% of eligible voters. The party is
enthusiastic about the European Union. In the European Parliament this
party is a member of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.
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1.9 Appendix B
Table 1.20: The logit model of turnout – results
Dependent variable Voting
Coefficienta z-Stat.
Sense 0.03 (0.47)
Town -.91 (-0.41)
Education .12 (2.04)**
Interest .21 (1.52)
Internet 0.11 (0.37)
MALE = 1 .39 (1.84)**
Age .09 (2.49)**
Age2 -.01 (-1.98)**
Vote 2005 = 1 1.38 (5.68)***
Prob LiD -9.57 (-1.36)
Prob PIS -6.42 (-2.28)**
Prob PO -1.99 (-0.37)
Prob PSL 2.00 (0.19)
Labor Union -.05 (-0.14)
Income .00 (0.18)
Wald χ2 p-value 0.00
No. of observations 587
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
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Table 1.21: Alienation hypothesis – t-Test Results
Education = 1
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 1.503 .073
Voters 1.443 .148
Combined 1.473 .075
Difference .059
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.63 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.73 P (T > t) = 0.36
Education = 2
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .844 .063
Voters .923 .041
Combined .895 .034
Difference -.078
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.14 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.28 P (T > t) = 0.85
Education = 3
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .758 .090
Voters .613 .145
Combined .694 .080
Difference .145
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.79 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.40 P (T > t) = 0.20
Education = 4
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .932 .050
Voters .803 .035
Combined .849 .029
Difference .128
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.98 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.03 P (T > t) = 0.01
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Table 1.22: Alienation hypothesis – t-Test Results
Education = 5
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .637 .188
Voters .544 .124
Combined .585 .102
Difference .093
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.66 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.67 P (T > t) = 0.33
Education = 6
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .774 .058
Voters .762 .058
Combined .766 .044
Difference .011
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.54 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.90 P (T > t) = 0.45
Education = 7
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .698 .049
Voters .703 .028
Combined .702 .024
Difference -.005
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.45 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.91 P (T > t) = 0.54
Education = 8
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .792 .088
Voters .847 .089
Combined .834 .070
Difference -.055
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.37 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.74 P (T > t) = 0.62
73
Chapter 1. Spatial Analysis of the Polish Parliament 2007-2010
Table 1.23: Alienation hypothesis – t-Test Results cont’d
Education = 9
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .800 .131
Voters .694 .089
Combined .721 .073
Difference .105
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.72 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.55 P (T > t) = 0.27
Education = 10
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .970 .101
Voters .693 .063
Combined .752 .056
Difference .276
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.97 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.04 P (T > t) = 0.02
Education = 11
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers .789 .055
Voters .682 .038
Combined .703 .033
Difference .107
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.90 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.19 P (T > t) = 0.09
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Table 1.24: Indifference hypothesis – t-Test Results
Education = 1
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 2.075 .190
Voters 2.164 .083
Combined 2.119 .095
Difference -.089
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.34 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.69 P (T > t) = 0.65
Education = 2
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 2.035 .058
Voters 1.819 .055
Combined 1.895 .042
Difference .215
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.99 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.01 P (T > t) = 0.00
Education = 3
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 1.425 .296
Voters 1.677 .382
Combined 1.537 .225
Difference -.251
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.30 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.61 P (T > t) = 0.69
Education = 4
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 1.924 .056
Voters 1.851 .047
Combined 1.877 .036
Difference .072
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.82 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.34 P (T > t) = 0.17
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Table 1.25: Indifference hypothesis – t-Test Results
Education = 5
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 1.844 .275
Voters 1.966 .141
Combined 1.912 .136
Difference -.121
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.34 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.68 P (T > t) = 0.65
Education = 6
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 1.811 .112
Voters 1.828 .064
Combined 1.823 .056
Difference -.017
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.44 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.88 P (T > t) = 0.55
Education = 7
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 1.924 .057
Voters 1.779 .045
Combined 1.822 .036
Difference .144
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.96 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.07 P (T > t) = 0.03
Education = 8
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 1.782 .216
Voters 1.790 .097
Combined 1.788 .088
Difference -.008
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.48 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.96 P (T > t) = 0.51
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Table 1.26: Indifference hypothesis – t-Test Results cont’d
Education = 9
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 2.041 .265
Voters 1.665 .150
Combined 1.759 .132
Difference .375
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.88 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.23 P (T > t) = 0.11
Education = 10
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 1.264 .189
Voters 1.748 .092
Combined 1.644 .087
Difference -.483
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.01 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.02 P (T > t) = 0.98
Education = 11
Mean Std. Dev.
Abstainers 1.764 .101
Voters 1.673 .052
Combined 1.691 .046
Difference .090
Ha : Difference < 0 Ha : Difference 6= 0 Ha : Difference > 0
P (T < t) = 0.77 P (|T | > |t|) = 0.44 P (T > t) = 0.22
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Table 1.27: The MNP voter–specific model results
Choice Coef. S.E. z P > |z| 95% Conf. Interval
Party
distance -.403*** .028 -14.17 0.000 -.459 -.347
PIS (base alternative)
PO
Town .091*** .012 7.86 0.000 .068 .113
Education .037*** .008 4.41 0.000 .020 .053
PSL
Town -1.02*** .313 -3.26 0.001 -1.63 -.406
Education .151 .160 0.94 0.347 -.164 .465
LiD
Town -.070*** .016 4.38 0.000 .039 .101
Education .016 .010 1.56 0.118 -.004 .037
Wald χ2 = 818.99
P > χ2 = 0.000
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Chapter 2
Estimation of Party Positions: A
Comment on Schofield and
Zakharov (2010)
2.1 Introduction
Schofield and Zakharov (2010) in their recent publication present results of the
application of the mean voter theorem (Schofield (2007)) to the Russian Duma
elections of 2007. Using valence estimates from the multinomial logit model,
Schofield and Zakharov (2010) predict local Nash equilibrium (LNE) positions
of the parties. To construct such an empirical model a researcher needs to have
knowledge about the ideological positions of both voters and parties. Ascertaining
the ideological positions of parties and in particular how these platforms are
perceived by the voters, is a vast methodological problem. Several approaches
have been proposed in the literature. Benoit and Laver (2006) suggest the use
of expert surveys, while other studies make use of party manifestos (Gabel and
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Huber (2000), Budge et al. (2001)) or their own expert judgement.
Schofield and Zakharov (2010) assume that parties’ positions reflect the mean
preferences of their respective electorates. In this comment we show that the
latter approach is misleading. In particular, we show that the choice of a method
of measuring ideological positions of parties influences the estimates of equilib-
rium positions and other conclusions drawn from the model. Using the same
dataset of voters’ ideal points and electoral decisions, we find that estimation
with declared positions leads to a conclusion of a likely convergence whereas es-
timation with mean preferences of the electorate as a proxy for parties’ positions
results in strong evidence for divergence. We argue that the latter approach is
inappropriate in the probabilistic voting set–up.
2.2 The Model
Let us briefly restate the assumptions and findings of Schofield (2007). Each of
the parties, in the set P = {1, . . . , j, . . . , p} chooses a policy, zj ∈ X, to declare to
the electorate prior to the election, where X is an open convex subset of Euclidean
space, Rw, with w finite. Formally, the utility of voter i is given by
uij = λj − β||xi − zj||2 + εij, (2.1)
where λj is the valence of party j, xi is the ideal point of the voter, zj is the party
policy (declared before the election takes place) and εij is the stochastic error.
This error term captures the uncertainty about voters’ decisions on the side of
the parties. {xi ∈ X}i∈N is the set of of voter ideal points for the members of
the electorate, N , of size n. It is assumed that valences are exogenous and can
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be ranked, so that λp > λp−1 > · · · > λ1. The cumulative distribution of the
error terms is assumed to be C2–differentiable, so that the individual probability
functions ρij will also be C
2–differentiable in the strategies zj and the vote shares
defined as
Vj(z) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
ρij(z) (2.2)
are also C2–differentiable. It is further assumed that the joint distribution of the
error term is the Type I extreme value distribution.
Schofield (2007) defines an equilibrium concept – a Local Nash Equilibrium
(LNE) as below.
Definition 5 A strategy vector z∗ is a local Nash equilibrium iff, for each party
j ∈ P , there exists a neighborhood Xj of z∗j in X such that
Vj(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
j , . . . , z
∗
p) ≥ Vj(z∗1 , . . . , zj, . . . , z∗p) for all zj ∈ Xj. (2.3)
This definition does not rely on the global concavity of voters’ probabilities func-
tions, but the LNE is defined as a local maximum of the vote share function,
given the positions of all other parties. The following definitions are needed to
present the main theorem of Schofield (2007)1.
Definition 6 The electoral covariance matrix.
1 The electoral covariance matrix is ∇∗ = 1
n
∇, where ∇ = [(ξs, ξt)]w×w and
ξt = (x1t, x2t, . . . , xnt) ∈ Rn is the vector of the t-th coordinates of the set
of the n voters’ ideal points and (·) denotes a scalar product.
1Additional minor assumptions are necessary to prove the following theorem. Please
refer to Schofield (2007) for details.
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2 The total electoral variance is
υ2 ≡
w∑
r=1
υ2r = tr(∇∗), (2.4)
where w is the dimensionality of the issue space.
Definition 7 The convergence coefficient of the valence model.
1 Define
ρj ≡
[
1 +
∑
k 6=j
exp(λk − λj)
]−1
. (2.5)
2 The coefficient Aj for party j is
Aj = β(1− 2ρj). (2.6)
3 The characteristic matrix for party j is
Cj = [2Aj∇∗ − Iw×w] . (2.7)
4 The convergence coefficient of the model is
c = 2β(1− 2ρ1)υ2 = 2A1υ2, (2.8)
where valence is ranked, so that j = 1 denotes the party with the lowest
valence.
For the joint origin2 to be a LNE the following conditions, as given by Theorem
2, must be met.
2We first transform coordinates so that in the new coordinates, x∗ = 0. We shall
refer to z∗0 = (0, . . . , 0) as the joint origin in this new coordinate system.
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Theorem 2 (Schofield, 2007) The joint origin satisfies the first–order necessary
condition for a LNE for the valence model. The second–order necessary condition
for the joint origin to be a LNE is that every eigenvalue of the characteristic
matrix C1 = [2A1∇∗ − I] is negative.
The first–order necessary condition for the joint origin to be a LNE (which
is always fulfilled whenever valence is determined exogenously) is provided in
Schofield (2006). Intuitively a LNE at the joint origin is less likely, the greater
are parameters β, υ2 and λp − λ1.
Corollary 2 In the two–dimensional case, a sufficient condition for the joint
origin to be a LNE for the valence model is that c < 1.
The intuition behind Theorem 2 is easy to follow. The second–order necessary
condition simply states that the local Nash equilibrium at the joint origin is
possible, if it is a local maximum of the vote share function. The value of the
β parameter has a straightforward interpretation: the higher it is, the more
’deterministic’ the behavior of voters is. In other words, for higher β, the spatial
distance is a more important component of the utility. As shown already by
Adams (1999), for low values of β, policies are more convergent and an equilibrium
located at the mean of the preferences’ distribution is expected. If β is sufficiently
high, we can no longer hope for a global Nash equilibrium, but a divergent Local
Nash Equilibrium can be found.
If voters are uninformed and unable to assess the parties’ positions correctly,
or they misperceive them on a basis of e.g. previous experiences3, this will be
3In Chapter 1, we show that market–oriented reforms introduced in years 2001-2003
by the social–democrat party SLD in Poland, still affected perception of this party’s
economic stance in the 2007 elections.
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reflected by the increased error component of the empirically estimated utility
function and will negatively impact the value of β.
The crucial part of the estimation is the choice of observations for zj. Schofield
and Zakharov (2010) assume that the parties are located at the mean preferences
of their respective electorates. This implies a high degree of certainty in parties’
inference of voters’ ideal points as it contains an implicit supposition that the
parties almost certainly know who will vote in their favor before the election
takes place. Formally, the assumption of Schofield and Zakharov (2010) about
the position of party j is
zj =
1
nj
∑
i∈Nj
xi, (2.9)
where {xi ∈ X}i∈Nj is the set of of voter ideal points for the members of
the electorate, Nj of party j, of size nj. To adopt such a platform, a party j
should know the set of indices Nj before the election takes place. In other words,
such a perfect positioning is only possible if the error term incorporated in the
utility of voters is negligible i.e. the model is (almost) deterministic. Thus, this
operational assumption of certainty about the future undermines the conceptual
premises about uncertainty built into the theory of probabilistic voting itself (see,
e.g. Budge (1994) for a further discussion of uncertainty in spatial models).
As we show in the next section, the choice of method for measuring party
positions has a major influence on the predictions drawn from the model. In
particular, we show that the methodology chosen by Schofield and Zakharov
(2010) leads to predictions suggesting divergence from the joint origin, which is
understandable in light of the above arguments.
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2.3 Results
In order to show the severity of the impact of using mean preferences as a proxy
for parties’ platforms, we compare the results of two valence models estimates
using data on the Polish parliamentary elections of 2007. As ’declared positions’
we use information obtained directly from parties’ spokespersons, whom we asked
to answer questions about their party’s stance on key economic and social issues.
A detailed description of the issues and the procedure of factor analysis that
identified two dimensions of policy can be found in Chapter 1. In cases where no
data were obtained directly, we used information published in parties’ manifestos.
Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 present a comparison of the declared positions of the
parties and the positions calculated as the mean preferences of the respective
electorates.
Table 2.1: Declared Positions vs Mean Electorate Preference
Positions Mean Electorate
Party Economic Religious Economic Religious
PIS -1.32 0.36 -1.42 0.09
PO 1.09 0.53 -0.73 0.21
PSL 0.30 0.54 -1.13 0.11
LiD -0.07 -1.44 -0.77 0.09
There is a striking discrepancy between the presented values, especially in the
religious dimension4. This result suggests that either voters make a substantial
error in the perception of parties’ positions or that the impact of ideology on
their electoral decisions is low. In both cases, the effect of using mean preference
proxies as party positions will result in an upward bias of the β parameter. In
4Equal stance on social issues of the PIS and LiD parties seems particularly prob-
lematic as these two, according to political studies of Polish politics, represent far
opposite views on key social issues. See e.g. Benoit and Laver (2006) for expert survey
estimates of these parties’ positions in 2004.
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Figure 2.1: Actual positions and mean preferences of respective electors
Table 2.2 we show estimates of the spatial distance parameter (β) and valences,
calculated using party declarations, as compared to mean electorate preferences.
As expected, the estimate of β obtained using mean preferences is much
higher, indicating that the model is much more ’deterministic’. Thus, using this
estimate further on to calculate characteristic matrices and making predictions
about equilibrium positions will imply a bias towards divergence. Comparison of
log likelihoods for the two models, does not give any insight about which should
be considered superior. Referring back to the first column of Table 2.2, we find
that the lowest valence party is the PSL and that the β coefficient equals 0.470.
The covariance matrix of voters’ positions is
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Table 2.2: The MNL valence model results - comparison
Positions Mean Electorate
Choice Coef.a z-Stat. Coef. z-Stat.
Party
Spatial Distance (β) .470*** (6.18) 1.389*** (7.74)
PIS (base) (base)
PO
Valence (λPO) 0.665*** (4.75) .126 (1.27)
PSL
Valence (λPSL) -1.088*** (-6.66) -1.371*** (-8.96)
LiD
Valence (λLiD) -.619*** (-3.83) -1.070*** (7.63)
Log likelihood -681.05 -669.33
No. of obs. 579
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
∇∗0 =
0.983 0.071
0.071 0.351

and the characteristic matrix for the PSL party is
ρPSL ' 1
1 + exp(1.088) + exp(1.088 + 0.665) + exp(1.088− 0.619) ' 0.096
CPSL = (2 · 0.470 · (1− 2 · 0.096))
0.983 0.071
0.071 0.351
− I =
−0.253 0.054
0.054 −0.734

The eigenvalues of the CPSL matrix are −0.247 and −0.740 for the eco-
nomic and religious dimension respectively. The corresponding eigenvectors are
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−0.994
−0.110
 and
−0.110
0.994
. The overall convergence coefficient is
c = 2β(1− 2ρPSL)trace(∇∗) = 2 · 0.380 · (0.983 + 0.351) = 1.014.
Both eigenvalues of the characteristic matrix are negative, indicating that
the vote share functions are concave at the joint origin, and it follows that the
necessary condition of Schofield (2007) is fulfilled. The sufficient condition is not
fulfilled, as the value of c is slightly larger than 1. This might be the result of
computational inaccuracy and suggests that convergence is still highly likely. The
corresponding eigenvectors represent the axes along which the eigenvalues show
the direction of movement. In the case above, we note that along both axes the
gradient points towards the joint origin.
Let us now compare the above findings with the results obtained from the
model in which we used the mean preferences of the respective electorates as
approximations of the ideological positions of the parties (denoted with asterisk).
The estimate of β∗ is 1.389, which is, as expected, much higher than in the first
model. The respective coefficients’ values are
ρ∗PSL ' 0.102
C∗PSL =
2.174 0.157
0.157 0.776

The eigenvalues of this characteristic matrix are 1.1914 and −0.2414. The
overall convergence coefficient equals
c∗ = 2β∗(1− 2ρ∗PSL)trace(∇∗) = 2 · 1.106 · (0.983 + 0.351) = 2.950 > 1.
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Comparing with theorem 2, we see that the necessary condition fails, since the
first eigenvalue is positive, which means that the joint origin is a saddle–point.
Along the main electoral axis i.e. the first eigenvector (corresponding to the
economic dimension), the gradient points outwards and we should observe diver-
gence from the joint origin. The sufficient condition also fails, as the value of the
convergence coefficient is higher than 1.
2.4 Conclusions
We have shown that the choice of method of measuring the party positions may
be a crucial factor which determines the conclusions drawn from the model. The
choice of mean preferences as a proxy implies a high degree of certainty on the
part of voters about the ideologies of parties and vice–versa. We argue that this
assumption contradicts the idea of probabilistic voting and moreover does not
seem to be realistic. Hence we conclude that the estimates of equilibrium positions
derived from the results of Schofield and Zakharov (2010) are not credible.
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Chapter 3
Campaign Finance Regulations
and Policy Convergence: The
Role of Interest Groups and
Valence
3.1 Introduction
In an ideal democracy, public policy is guided by the will of the people and
the ”one man, one vote” principle. In reality, policies are diverted away from
the will of electors towards representing interests of only certain groups of the
society. Parties need to spend large amounts of money for campaign activities
and the incentive to gain financial means from various sources is increasing. The
main aim of campaign finance regulation is to make income and expenditure of
parties more transparent for both the regulatory authorities and the public and
to decrease the incentive to seek financial sources that could distort their political
Chapter 3. Campaign Finance Regulations and Policy Convergence: The Role of
Interest Groups and Valence
agenda. As argued by Grossman and Helpman (2001), preventing parties from
distorting their policy choices can raise aggregate welfare.
In this paper we make a first attempt to test empirically the impact of diverse
campaign financing institutions on placement of parties in a spatial model of
competition. Anticipating our results, we state that the limit on individual con-
tributions is associated with convergence of platforms, whereas other commonly
found institutions, such as direct public funding, the public disclosure of income
statements as well as ban on corporate donations lead to adoption of more radical
positions.
In this work, we link diverse strands of literature: theoretical predictions
about party positions, literature on diverse campaign finance regulations and
empirical work, which established that campaign expenditure does have effect on
increasing vote shares. The link is established by the term ’valence’, which loosely
speaking comprises all the non–spatial characteristics of parties. The fact that,
there exists no empirical work linking campaign finance provisions and policy
positions constitutes the main motivation for this study.
We base our analysis of policy convergence on theoretical predictions of
Schofield (2007) and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), who find that
bigger differences in valence among competing parties should result in more di-
vergent positions in the issue space as well as on the broad literature analyzing
the impact of special interests on parties’ platforms.
The theoretical literature on different campaign finance institutions is broad.
With regard to public funding, it is usually argued that replacing ”tainted money”
from interest groups with tax–financed ”clean money” leads to voters’ welfare im-
provement while it dampens incentives to offer non–policy favors to contributors.
Moreover, it encourages better representation of voters’ preferences, unlike the
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private funding system in which parties need to satisfy ideological preferences
of only certain groups of the society (see e.g. Coate (2004a), Ashworth (2006)).
However, it might be the case, that public financing serves as a device to freeze
party competition and exclude new competitors, whereas these could improve
on preferences representation or be of better quality (see, Scarrow (2006), Coate
(2004b)). The above statements are intuitive, but have yet not been tested in a
formal way.
Most of the theoretical work assessing the impact of campaign expenditure
has stressed the informational aspect of campaigning (see, e.g. Coate (2004b)).
For the purpose of this study important theoretical insights have been provided
by Coate (2004a) who finds that evaluations of the candidates are influenced by
voters’ beliefs about the sources of income at politicians’ disposal. More precisely,
a rational voter would evaluate the quality of a candidate (or a party) as lower
if he expects that he (it) is involved in bargaining with interest groups. These
findings have also been confirmed by recent experimental results of Houser and
Stratmann (2008).
There exists also a well–established empirical literature, on how diverse cam-
paign financing rules affect election outcomes. Stratmann (2006a) analyzes the
role of contribution limits on closeness of elections, to find that limits on contribu-
tions narrow the margin of victory. Moreover, Stratmann (2006b) tests whether
campaign expenditures by state House candidates are more productive in increas-
ing vote shares when candidates run in states that limit contributions. The results
show that campaign expenditures are more productive when candidates run in
states with campaign contribution limits, which suggests a positive impact of the
transparency of income sources on valence creation. Furthermore, in states with
contribution limits, incumbent and challenger spending are equally productive,
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and spending by both candidates is quantitatively important in increasing their
vote shares.
The number of empirical studies regarding positions of parties dependent on
their valences is limited. Recent work of Stone and Simas (2010) finds that
incumbents with a valence advantage place themselves closer to their district me-
dians, while disadvantaged challengers take the more extreme policy positions.
This is consistent with the theoretical findings of Schofield (2007). Clouse (2007)
analyzes the 2004 US presidential primaries and similarly finds that there is a
negative relationship between valences of candidates and their ideological prox-
imity on the key political issues. We are not aware of any empirical work of this
kind for multiparty systems.
In the next section we briefly describe findings of Schofield (2006) and Schofield
(2007). In Section 3.3 we describe sources of data and the methodology, in partic-
ular concentrating on the practical aspects of campaign finance law. In addition,
on the basis of the theoretical predictions we formulate hypotheses on the impact
of diverse campaign finance institutions on the policy convergence. In Section 3.4
we present the results of our empirical study. Section 3.5 concludes and discusses
methodological concerns involved.
3.2 Theoretical Predictions
3.2.1 The Role of Valence and Special Interests
Let us here briefly restate assumptions and findings of Schofield (2007). Each of
the parties, in the set P = {1, . . . , j, . . . , p} chooses a policy, zj ∈ X, to declare to
the electorate prior to the election, where X is an open convex subset of Euclidean
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space, Rw, with w finite. Formally, the utility of a voter is given by
uij = λj − β||xi − zj||2 + εij, (3.1)
where λj is the valence of party j, xi is the ideal point of the voter, zj
is the party policy (declared before the election takes place) and εij is the
stochastic error (for each voter assumed to be drawn from the same probabil-
ity distribution). It is assumed that valences are exogenous and can be ranked
λp > λp−1 > · · · > λ1. The cumulative distribution of the error terms is assumed
to be C2–differentiable, so that the individual probability functions ρij will also
be C2–differentiable in the strategies zj and what follows vote shares Vj defined
as
Vj(z) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
ρij(z) (3.2)
are also C2–differentiable. ρj is the individual probability of voting for j and n
denotes the cardinality of the set of voters N .
The mean voter theorem of Lin et al. (1999) shows that the joint mean vector
z∗ = (x∗, . . . , x∗) is a Nash equilibrium in the situation of zero valence. This result
relies on the assumption of the concavity of vote share functions, which cannot
in general be assured. Schofield (2007) defines a weaker equilibrium concept – a
local strict Nash equilibrium (LSNE) defined below.
Definition 8 A strategy vector z∗ is a local strict Nash equilibrium iff, for each
agent j ∈ P , there exists a neighborhood Xj of z∗j in X such that
Vj(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
j , . . . , z
∗
p) > Vj(z
∗
1 , . . . , zj, . . . , z
∗
p) for all zj ∈ Xj − {z∗j }. (3.3)
In can be readily seen that this definition does not rely on the global concavity
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of voters’ probabilities functions, but the LSNE is defined as local maximum of
the vote function given positions of all other parties. In a similar manner a local
Nash equilibrium (LNE) is defined:
Definition 9 A strategy vector z∗ is a local Nash equilibrium (LNE) iff, for each
agent j ∈ P , there exists a neighborhood Xj of z∗j in X such that
Vj(z
∗
1 , . . . , z
∗
j , . . . , z
∗
p) ≥ Vj(z∗1 , . . . , zj, . . . , z∗p) for all zj ∈ Xj. (3.4)
Obviously by definitions 8 and 9 if z∗ is a LSNE it is also a LNE. We will
further assume that the joint distribution of the error term is the Type I extreme
value distribution. For all the minor assumptions necessary to prove the following
theorem please refer to Schofield (2007). The following definitions are however,
needed to present the main theorem of Schofield (2007).
Definition 10 The electoral covariance matrix.
1 The electoral covariance matrix is ∇∗ = 1
n
∇, where ∇ is [(ξs, ξt)]w×w and
ξt = (x1t, x2t, . . . , xnt) ∈ RN is the vector of the t-th coordinates of the set
of n voters’ ideal points and (·) denotes a scalar product.
2 The total electoral variance is
υ2 =
w∑
r=1
υ2r = tr(∇∗), (3.5)
where w is the dimensionality of the issue space.
Definition 11 The convergence coefficient of the valence model.
1 Define
ρj =
[
1 +
∑
k 6=j
exp(λk − λj)
]−1
. (3.6)
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2 The coefficient Aj for party j is
Aj = β(1− 2ρj). (3.7)
3 The characteristic matrix for party j is
Cj = [2Aj∇∗ − Iw×w] . (3.8)
4 The convergence coefficient of the model is
c = 2β(1− 2ρ1)υ2 = 2A1υ2, (3.9)
where valence is ranked so that j = 1 denotes the party with the lowest
valence.
For the joint origin to be a LNE the following necessary conditions must be
met as given by Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (Schofield, 2007) The joint origin satisfies the first–order necessary
condition to be a LNE for the valence model. The further second–order necessary
condition for the joint origin to be an LNE is that every eigenvalue of the char-
acteristic matrix C1 = [2A1∇∗ − I] is negative.
In the case that X is w–dimensional then the necessary condition for the joint
origin to be a LNE for the valence model is that c < w.
A first–order necessary condition for the joint origin to be an LNE, which
is always fulfilled whenever valence is determined exogenously, is provided in
Schofield (2006). Intuitively a LNE at the joint origin is less likely, the greater
are parameters β, υ2 and λp − λ1.
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Corollary 3 In the two–dimensional case, a sufficient condition for the joint
origin to be an LNE for the valence model is that c < 1.
The most interesting conclusion from the above cited results for the purpose
of this study is that whenever there exist bigger differences in valences of parties,
that is when λp−λ1 is large, we should observe more divergence in the equilibrium
positions of parties. This result is very intuitive. Stokes (1963) was the first to
stress the importance of non spatial aspects. It is understandable that the can-
didate with a valence disadvantage will lose the election if he chooses a platform
identical to his opponent’s. He thus has an incentive to choose a different plat-
form. Valence advantages then account for differentiation in the spatial model.
In the above cited model valence is exogenous with respect to a party’s position
in the issue space. If we introduce a concept that valence can be a function of
the ideological stance, the results remain similar. Endogenous valence creation
in Schofield (2006) is due to activists who provide contributions to parties. The
utility function of voters is, thus given by
uij = λj + µj(zj)− β||xi − zj||2 + εij, (3.10)
where µj(zj) is the endogenous valence component, being a function of a party
position. It is shown in Schofield (2006), that if we introduce the endogenous
valence component, a necessary first order condition for the equilibrium is given
by the balance equation
[
dj
dzj
− z∗j
]
+
1
2β
dµj
dzj
= 0, (3.11)
where the bracketed term is termed the marginal electoral pull of party j and is
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a gradient vector pointing towards the weighted electoral mean. This weighted
electoral mean is the point where the electoral pull is zero. The vector
dµj
dzj
is
called the marginal activist pull for party j. The balance condition informs
us that whenever activist pull is strong, a more divergent solution will be in
equilibrium.
It is important to stress that the model of Schofield (2006) predicts the positive
impact of activists on the valence of a party, i.e. it refers to the ’grassroots’ aspect
of campaign financing. On the contrary, as we already noted in the introduction,
rational voters should negatively assess the quality of a party if they find that
it is involved in ’parleys’ with ’plutocratic’ funders. Obviously the value of the
convergence coefficient and the activist pull are also functions of the β parameter
and the variance of electoral preferences. It is reasonable to assume that variance
of electoral preferences and the β parameter are not affected by the campaign
finance law, so it is reasonable to assume randomness of them with regard to the
analyzed institutions.
Conclusions similar to those of Schofield (2007) can be drawn from the theoret-
ical results of Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) who analyze a two–stage
game. In the first step parties choose platforms and later they invest in costly
valences. The marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization: the
closer the platforms are, the more the election outcome is affected by valence.
Consequently, candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms
to soften the competition in valence. The findings of these two models are in-
teresting, while although in both of them parties, do not have policy preferences
(act as vote maximizers), differences in valence cause them to adopt divergent
positions in equilibrium, which might increase quality of representation of voters’
preferences.
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Yet, another theoretical work that predicts similar behavior in a two–party
model is Serra (2010), which finds that there is a positive relationship between
platform polarization and valence polarization. If we interpret valence as cam-
paign funds, then we are making a prediction that is consistent with an empirical
fact in politics: an increase in campaign spending should be correlated with an
increase in polarization, which has been observed in the United States during the
past decades (McCarty et al. (2006)).
3.2.2 The Relationship Between Valence and Campaign
Finance Law
Valence has been extensively analyzed and diverse scholars have given this term
diverse interpretations. Valence advantage can be the result of e.g. a greater
capacity to commit to a precise platform or party support (Wiseman (2005)). It
can also be an effect of certain past events that affected popular perception of a
particular party, such as corruption. Another interesting interpretation of valence
is provided by Snyder and Ting (2002) in a model of party discipline. In their
model, discipline screens potential members of a party on the basis of ideology.
Thus more disciplined parties have less dispersed distributions of members’ ideal
points. Holding the mean ideology constant, this reduced dispersion acts as
a valence term for risk–averse voters. A prominent interpretation of valence,
is that it is built up by advertising or other campaign activities, as argued by,
among others Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009). We adopt their approach
in this work. In this interpretation valence is directly related to building up a
name recognition or in other words a popular image of a party by engagement
in campaigning. In this, it can be also described as persuasive campaigning as it
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has been defined by Mueller and Stratmann (1994).
Figure 3.1: Relationship between expenditure and valence.
Figure 3.1 presents the relationship between the level of campaign expendi-
ture1 and valence of parties in parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom,
Canada and Poland obtained with a MNL estimates of Schofield et al. (2010a),
Schofield et al. (2010b) and Schofield and Jeon (2010) and those provided in
Chapter 1 of this work. The fitted curve represents a fractional polynomial re-
gression fit of the model, in which the level of valence is a function of both, own
expenditure and spending of all other parties in each election. We observe a non–
linear relationship between the level of spending and the level of valence, which
is commonly found in studies of the impact of expenditure on electoral results
in both majoritarian (see e.g. Jacobson (1985)) and proportional representation
systems (e.g. Benoit and Marsh (2010)). Decreasing marginal return to spending
implies that parties, which already gathered a substantial stock of valence are
1Sources: Official reports of electoral commissions of Poland (State Electoral Com-
mission of Poland (2005)), Canada (Elections Canada (2004)) and the United Kingdom.
(The Electoral Commission (2005))
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not able to alter their popular image as much as their less–known competitors.
Figure 3.2: Relationship between differences in expenditure and differences in
valences between the parties.
Another way to present the relationship between valence and expenditure is
shown in Figure 3.2. The dependent variable is the difference between valences
of pairs of parties in each election. It is a function of both own spending and
the expenditure of the opponent. More precisely we regress the difference in
valences on the difference in expenditure levels of both parties. The dashed line
in Figure 3.2 depicts fitted values from this regression. The solid line represents
a linear prediction from the model in which we also add differences in fractions of
spending relative to the overall spending for each pair of parties in the election.
We observe a positive relationship between the lead in valence in each pair and
the advantage in campaign expenditure.
Combining the above findings we hypothesize that differences in valence should
be associated with more divergent positions of parties. We will turn to a more
precise description of the impact of the each analyzed institution on platforms in
the next section.
102
Chapter 3. Campaign Finance Regulations and Policy Convergence: The Role of
Interest Groups and Valence
3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Campaign Finance Institutions
Table 3.1: Campaign Finance Institutions – A Summary
Questions No. of countriesa
Is party financing regulated?b 34
Is there an obligatory public disclosure of financial statements? 32
Is there a limit on how much a party can raise? 4
Is there a limit on campaign expenditure? 21
Is there a limit on individual contributions? 25
Do parties receive direct public funding? 39
Do parties receive equal direct public funding? 3
Do parties receive indirect public funding (e.g. free media access)? 36
Do parties receive equal indirect public funding? 16
Is there a ban on corporate donations? 12
Total 46
aA number of countries in the sample, in which the institution is in place.
bAccording to assessment of IDEA and Council of Europe, in some countries within the sample certain
aspects of party financing laws are poorly regulated and practical enforcement of legal provisions is impossible.
A number of countries in our sample are characterized with a rather weak
rule of law and imperfect enforcement procedures. In certain cases particular
institutions are de jure present, but are not followed in practice. That is why we
decided to trust the assessment of legal institutions conducted in expert analyses,
rather than directly studying electoral law. We denoted presence of a particular
institution only in cases, in which evaluation reports stated practical importance
of a certain rule. The list of sources of these data is provided in Table 3.5 in
the appendix. Data on party positions, as provided by Benoit and Laver (2006)
correspond to diverse elections in diverse years. Party funding law has been
subject to change in the analyzed countries. The reason for these changes was,
among others Council of Europe recommendations for particular cases. In most
cases it was possible to assess, only on a basis of country reports, which rules were
in place for the election period, but not always. We, thus excluded one country
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from the sample (Belarus2).
Based on the theoretical predictions from Schofield (2006) as well as the litera-
ture on special interests, we formulate the following hypotheses about the impact
of diverse institutions on the policy convergence. Various limits on spending and
income should positively affect convergence in platforms. There are two chan-
nels for this effect. First is that the limit on campaign expenditure decreases
the ability to create a popular image by campaign efforts for bigger, well–known
parties, which should result in smaller differences in valences between the com-
petitors. Thus, as predicted by the theory a limit on campaign spending should
be associated with more convergent platforms.
The second channel is the impact of interest groups or, using nomenclature
of Schofield (2006), party activists’ contributions. Whenever private financing is
involved, it’s effect on valence is unclear. On the one hand, valence is created en-
dogenously by grassroots contributors, but on the other, rational voters knowing
that parties can trade policies and non–policy favors for funding from plutocratic
sources, might have worse perceptions of parties’ quality. We will assume, that
there are two groups of voters in the society: informed and uninformed and that
campaign activity is in it’s nature persuasive (that is, it affects valence) and not
informative. In the spatial model context with probabilistic voting, uninformed
means that the error term in the utility is high, and therefore the β parameter
is low - hence, the vote share is less fragile to changes in platforms. Parties dis-
tort their policy choices to attract money from interest groups and then use this
money to attract the votes of the uninformed, by the cost of losing the votes of the
2Moreover, in the case of Belarus it is, because of it’s political environment, improba-
ble that any rules included in the electoral legislation are of practical importance, which
was an additional factor for which we decided to exclude this country from the analyzed
sample.
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informed electors. This relies on the assumption, that only the informed voters
have rational expectations about the interest groups’ activities to distort plat-
forms. In case the uninformed voters also had rational expectations, a majority
of them would switch their votes to the unadvertised party and the advertising
would actually lose parties’ votes and none would be undertaken in equilibrium.
This clearly contradicts factual observations. The overall effect of private financ-
ing on platforms will, thus depend on the strength of three effects: the increase in
valence by persuading the uninformed voters, the centrifugal interest groups’ pull
and the magnitude of the decrease in valence associated with policy distortions.
In any case, as predicted by Schofield (2007), in equilibrium the lowest valence
parties will be located farthest away from the center of electoral preferences. The
opposite also holds: parties that distorted their platforms to the most radical
positions, will have the lowest valence. It is important to understand, that the
result holds only in equilibrium. The theoretical literature predicts that the re-
lationship between the assessed quality of a party and it’s position runs in both
directions and that the equilibrium results of Schofield (2007) do not add any
more insight to the question of causality.
Direct as well as indirect public funding is argued to promote representation,
as it allows smaller parties to gather funds to compete with stronger parties. The
existence of public funding should in principle positively affect the number of
parties present, however the effect on valence creation is again unclear. Whenever
public funding is provided, it can de facto emphasize differences in valences and
consequently lead to stronger divergence of policies. Such a freezing effect is
suspected because the distribution of both direct payments and indirect subsidies
(such as allocation of free broadcast time) tends to be proportional to past party
success (Scarrow (2007)). The hypothesis of divergence as a result of public
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funding will therefore be true under the assumption, that inequality of funding
overwhelms the effect of decreasing marginal return to campaign efforts. If the
second channel for divergence, that it is the impact of activists, is also present,
public financing can serve to decrease it by replacing ’tainted money’ with public
means. That is why we also test the impact of an interaction between a ban on
corporate donations and matching public funding. This interaction coefficient is
expected to have a negative sign.
Finally, an intuitive determinant of divergence of parties’ positions is the ef-
fect of proportional representation (see, Ezrow (2008) for a detailed discussion).
The effect of proportional representation versus plurality rule on divergence is
twofold. Firstly, by means of Duverger’s Law it is associated with a higher
number of parties than under plurality, and what follows practical existence of
more radical candidates. The second effect is more interesting. Schofield et al.
(2010a) formulated a hypothesis that the convergence coefficient will be higher
under proportional representation because of the usual necessity to form coali-
tions after the elections. They argue that activist groups do not need to coalesce
before the election to concentrate their influence. Activist groups linked to small
parties can still have access to the government as the bargaining domain (the
heart) in proportional representation systems will typically depend on the loca-
tion of smaller parties. These theoretical predictions have not been empirically
confirmed. Ezrow (2008) finds no evidence that average party policy extrem-
ism increases under proportional representation, nor that the policy extremism
increases in countries that feature large numbers of parties3.
The main problem associated with the interaction between policy divergence
3In one of the empirical specifications that we tested in this study we included the
effect of proportional representation and the number of parties but did not find it
significant in the regressions.
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and campaign finance institutions is that the causality runs in both directions.
A state legislative authority is likely to adopt strict rules in order to decrease
the impact of special interest groups on platforms. If the legislator implements
campaign finance institutions on a basis of divergence in platforms, they will
be endogenous in the model. Table 3.2 taken from Stratmann (2003), shows
correlations between the index of electoral rules strictness and three different
indices of corruption.
Table 3.2: Electoral rules and corruption.
BPI2002a CPI2002b WBCC2001c
-0.7014 -0.4694 -0.5133
(0.0075)d (0.0904) (0.0605)
aTI Bribe Payers Index
bTI Corruption Perception Index
cWorld Bank Corruption Control Index
dStd. errors in brackets
Stratmann (2003) notes that we cannot argue that strictness of rules causes cor-
ruption, or that the opposite relation is true. Rather, an unobservable variable
such as a country specific ”corrupt culture” may lead to the adoption of contribu-
tion limits and the presence of corruptness. Thus, the correlation result may be
due to the fact that countries that have an inherently more corrupt culture will
introduce strict rules in order to address the problem of already high levels of cor-
ruption. We present in Table 3.3 results of correlating particular institutions that
we analyze with two measures of the quality of the state and it’s independence
from political pressure estimated by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. (2010))4.
The results presented in Table 3.3 lead us to a conclusion that a limit on
individual contributions indeed might be a function of a general level of the
4One must note that diverse measures of quality of governance tend to be highly
correlated with each other and with measures of corruption.
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Table 3.3: Campaign finance institutions and the quality of governance.
Questions GEa CCbc
Is there an obligatory public disclosure of financial statements? -0.2896 -0.3280
Is there a limit on how much party can raise? -0.3059 -0.3730
Is there a limit on campaign expenditure? -0.1221 -0.1327
Is there a limit on individual contributions? -0.5185 -0.5158
Do parties receive direct public funding? 0.0585 0.0798
Is there a ban on corporate donations? -0.1118 -0.0447
aGovernment Effectiveness – capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures.
bControl of Corruption – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
cFor both indicators higher value denotes higher quality of governance.
quality of governance and that it needs to be considered endogenous with respect
to platforms’ divergence. In other words, strict contribution limits are also an
effect of a strong impact of special interests on party platforms.
To consider for all the above observations, we build a two–equation model, in
which one equation describes the behavior of parties being the effect of certain
campaign finance institutions, whereas the other describes the endogenous choice
of electoral rules by the legislator on a basis of his beliefs about level of impact
of special interests on parties’ platforms. On a basis of correlations reported in
Table 3.3 we will assume that the limit on individual contributions should be
treated endogenously, whereas the decision to implement other institutions does
not seem to be affected by the overall quality of governance in our sample.
3.3.2 Party Positions Estimates
The estimates of the party positions in diverse ideological dimensions were ob-
tained from a study by Benoit and Laver (2006). Benoit and Laver (2006) present
the estimates of party positions based on expert surveys in 47 countries. A total
of 36 questions were asked, 13 of which were country specific (e.g. the sovereignty
of Quebec in the case of Canada), 7 were specific to only a group of countries
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denoted as post–communist (e.g. the issue of privatization), 8 concerned Euro-
pean integration and the rest corresponded to general policy dimensions, such as
economic policy, social world–view, environment protection, immigration and so
on. Moreover, each dimension has been given a score which defines it’s relative
importance for the voters’ decision in each country. Additionally, each expert
has been asked to place each party on a left–right scale, solely on the basis of
his judgement, which does not have to be directly related to the platforms. As
shown by Benoit and Laver (2006), there is a strong relationship between the
left–right placement and social and economic dimensions. Table 6.1 in Benoit
and Laver (2006) indicates that the adjusted R2 for the model, in which social
and economic dimensions act as regressors for the left–right placement is high for
most countries in the sample, with significant coefficients for both dimensions in
31 out of 46 countries.
However, not for every country in the sample the socio–economic left–right
dimension was the one for which the strongest variation of parties’ positions is
observed. Additionally, in each country various policy dimensions are not equally
important for peoples’ voting decisions. We constructed an index that takes into
account both the fact that parties have different stances in different dimensions
and that some of policy dimensions are more important for voting decisions. It’s
construction is similar to the index of party compactness of Alvarez and Nagler
(2004). It also uses the information about the electoral results of parties in the
analyzed elections. We shall call this index weighted party extremism. We assume
that in each country the mean voter is located at the system center in each policy
dimension. Weighted party extremism is defined as:
WPEk =
∑
d
Id
∑
j V Sj|(Pjk −MV )|
σjk
, (3.12)
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where: Pjk – the ideological position of party j in country k, MV – the mean
voter position, V Sj – the vote share of party j, σjk – the standard deviation of
voters’ self–placement in the left–right scale, Id – the relative importance of the
policy dimension d.
This measure captures relative distances between the parties in each of the
policy dimensions. It also accounts for the fact that voters might have more
or less dispersed preferences. Moreover, it takes into account the fact that very
extremist parties are not actively present in the political scene. Finally, weighting
by the relative importance of each dimension reflects the fact that in relatively
less important policy dimensions the positioning might not have a significant
effect on the levels of valence of parties. A higher value of the index reflects
divergence from the system center.
3.4 Results
In this study we are interested in the behavior of parties, and not the decision of
the legislature to implement particular rules. Therefore, we concentrate on the
analysis of the first equation. As we described, there is an unobserved common
factor that affects both the choice of institutions and the policy divergence. Thus,
errors in the equations are likely to be correlated. We, therefore employ a three–
stage least squares procedure and estimate the two equations simultaneously. The
base–line model consists of two equations. One describes the choice of positions
by parties as a result of the institutions in place. The second contains description
of behavior of the authorities to introduce these (endogenous) institutions.
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WPEk = Xkβ + Z1kδ + νk (3.13)
Xk = WPEk + Z2kγ + ωk, (3.14)
where: Xk is the vector of endogenous institutions, Z1k and Z2k denote the exoge-
nous variables and E(νkωk) 6= 0. We instrument for the general level of ”corrupt-
ness” of a country with urbanization rate and education level measured as gross
enrolment in tertiary education - variables that describe the level of develop-
ment. These should be exogenous with respect to both the choice of institutions
and the policy divergence5. We found these6 to be strongly correlated with the
perception of corruption (see Table 3.9 in the appendix; see also, e.g. Rosenson
(2009) for a further discussion). The three-stage least squares procedure is less
robust than the two–stage least squares method to potential endogeneity of the
instruments in any of the equations. Nevertheless, the Hansen–Sargan statistics
suggest, that the instruments are with high probability valid and the advantage
is of this method is that it uses more information about the correlation structure
of the errors between the equations.
Schofield (2007) predicts a linear relationship between the difference in va-
lences of parties and the convergence coefficient. Moreover, there is no obvious
reason for why campaign finance institutions would affect convergence in a non–
linear way. Therefore we apply a linear specification for the equation describing
the behavior of parties. There is also no theory that would suggest the use of
a specific form of a relationship between the decision of the state to introduce
5Here we shall report the estimated coefficients of the behavioral equation for the
parties, which we are mostly interested in. Full results are reported in the appendix.
6Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
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campaign finance institutions and their assessment of the role of special interests
on policies. Thus, we also choose a linear form of the second equation. Addi-
tionally, we control for the number of parties in the political scene, defined as
the effective number of parties (see, Laakso and Taagepera (1979) for details).
It is important to notice that the magnitudes of the coefficients do not have an
exact interpretation, the only important feature is the the sign, positive meaning
a tendency towards more party extremism.
Table 3.4: Divergence – 3SLS regression
Dependent variable WPE
Coefficienta z-Stat.
Public Disclosure 18.23 (1.98)**
Ceiling on Contribu-
tions
-29.76 (-2.96)***
Direct Public Funding 9.26 (2.01)**
Equal Public Funding -14.84 (-1.46)
Ban on Corporate Do-
nations
35.78 (2.13)**
Ban on Corporate ×
Direct Public
-24.34 (-1.42)
Effective Number of
Parties
2.86 (1.87)**
Constant 70.69 (3.20)***
Pseudo R2 0.26
Hansen–Sargan p–
value
0.55
No. of observations 46
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
Public disclosure of income and expenditure statements has a positive effect
on platforms’ divergence. A direct technical insight from Theorem 3 is that the
lowest valence parties will locate their platforms farthest away from the joint
origin. The opposite relation is also true. Parties for which policy is strongly dis-
torted away from the center will actually have the lowest valence, whenever there
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is a least one voter with rational expectations. We therefore, argue that public
disclosure positively influences valences of parties who remain at the center of the
distribution of preferences. The reason is that, these are willing to report legit-
imate funding and raise their credibility in terms of sources of funding. For low
valence parties, whose positions have been determined by the influence groups,
public disclosure means a further decrease in valence, which causes them to adopt
even more radical positions.
The coefficient for ceiling on individual contributions is strongly significant
and negative. This finding is consistent with the literature on interest group im-
pact on policies. We associate this result, with decreasing the activist pull effect.
This result is also in line with the empirical results of Stratmann (2006b) who
finds that (though, only for a two–party competition) in states with contribution
limits, incumbent spending and challenger spending are equally productive. In
addition, spending by both candidates is quantitatively important in increasing
their vote shares. In other words, contribution limits, keeping platforms fixed,
increase the perception of the quality of the candidates. As we see in Table 3.3,
the ceiling on individual contributions is more likely in countries with lower qual-
ity of governance, but apparently it does have a significant impact on reducing
the role of special interests on platforms.
The coefficient for direct public funding is positive. As we observe almost no
correlation between this institution and the quality of governance, we argue that
the even more stressed valence advantage of bigger parties is the cause of this
effect. In other words, this result shows that proportional public funding retains
the advantage of bigger parties in campaign activities. This effect should be to
some extent eased in those cases in which public funding is provided at an equal
(or almost equal) basis. However, in the basis formulation we find that the effect
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of equal public funding is not significant.
The case of a ban of corporate donations is more complicated. It turns out
not to be significantly correlated with the quality of governance and perception
of interest groups’ activity, and at the same time it is related to high divergence
of policies. We argue that, whenever the state is not able to enforce compliance
with the law. By banning corporate donations, it has in practice less control over
the sources of income. It has been found in various legal and economic studies,
that severity of the law might have an adverse effect on compliance if it is not
accompanied by effective enforcement. Becker (1968) shows that the probability
of conviction and punishment negatively affects the utility from the commitment
of a crime. Thus, a higher risk of detection is associated with less crime. The
cost of crime (measured by the severity of punishment) is not enough to deter
undesired behavior as long as the probability of detection is low. So far, we
treated adoption of corporate bans as exogenous, but this result suggests that it
might be endogenous with regard to the quality of law enforcement, which clearly
requires further study.
Next, we find a negative effect of the interaction between a ban on corporate
donations and the presence of direct public funding on divergence, which is how-
ever insignificant. It would suggest, that a ban on corporate donations might
be a more effective tool for fighting activists’ impact on policies, if accompanied
by direct public funding. The latter,to some extent diminishes the incentive of
parties to seek illegal outside financing, while it decreases the gain from such an
activity, but that effect is very weak in our case.
Other variables that we tested for, as listed in table 3.1, in particular ceiling
on the overall amount of financial means that can be collected by a party, ceiling
on expenditure and indirect public funding were found not to have a significant
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effect on platforms’ divergence.
3.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
We employed certain robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our results. The
results of various specifications are reported in the appendix. We first tested the
effects of restricting the sample to 27 well–developed countries, that is by exclud-
ing those denoted as post–communist. These countries are characterized by less
dispersed levels of development of political institutions. Thus, one might expect
less variance in the unobserved level of ”corruptness” among them. Therefore
the magnitudes of coefficients should be lower, as the impact of interest groups
will be less severe. As Table 3.10 in the appendix shows, the signs of coefficients
remain the same and the magnitudes are indeed lower. Interestingly, the inter-
action term between a ban on corporate donations and direct public funding is
statistically significant at a 5% level in this regression. This suggests, that in
cases of well–developed countries a mixture of these two policies leads to more
convergence in platforms. As noted before, the issue of practical enforcement of
legal provisions might be a crucial factor here.
A second check was to exclude the ban on corporate donations, as with re-
spect to this variable we suspected that it might be endogenous. As we present
in Table 3.8, it is not strongly correlated with other regressors. Thus, the omit-
ted variable bias is unlikely. Table 3.12 shows that the signs of coefficients are
robust to this test, but the significance is lower for most coefficients. We did not
perform a similar check of excluding the public disclosure variable, as it is rela-
tively strongly correlated with the ceiling on contributions. Excluding it from the
regressions, might lead to an omitted variable bias, which would cause a problem
with interpreting this result. Finally, we restricted the sample to the countries
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with proportional representation electoral system, which makes it more unified.
In this case, signs of coefficients also remain the same and a significant effect of
direct public funding on platforms’ divergence remains in place (Table 3.11).
3.5 Conclusions
The results show that there is a significant correlation between certain campaign
financing law provisions and policy convergence in the spatial context. We find
a robust effect that a ceiling on individual contributions is associated with more
convergent platforms. Direct public funding, on the other hand is associated with
more divergent policies. Additionally, we find that a ban on corporate donations
is not an effective tool for fighting interest groups’ impact on platforms, as it
decreases the extent to which the state is able to control the sources of income.
We find it to be related to lower divergence of platforms in cases, in which it is
accompanied by the matching public funding, but the effect is weak.
In this paper, we focused only on the effect that various institutions have
on parties’ positions. However, as noted, these institutions are most probably
endogenous with respect to variables describing the quality of governance and
party extremism. There are possibly also other determinants important for the
decision to introduce certain institutions. These are not included in the analysis
conducted in this work and a closer look is left for future work. Another way
how the theoretical predictions of Schofield (2007) could be tested is to analyze
directly the campaign expenditures for individual parties on their positions in the
issue space. However, in many countries there are no rules for public disclosure of
expenditure statements, and in some cases there is no obligation at all to register
campaign expenditure. Thus, access to the necessary data will be limited to the
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countries, in which such rules are in place.
Another way to improve on the quality of estimates would be to broaden the
sample of the countries tested. This would, however be subject to certain short-
comings. The analyzed sample consists of well–developed countries for which we
have access to credible data regarding electoral law and the placement of plat-
forms. Broadening the sample, would mean inclusion of less–developed countries
with potentially unstable political situation and weak enforcement of law. This,
could raise the question of quality of the data used. We are aware that there are
limitations to interpretations of coefficients estimated in this study, but as we
stated this is a first attempt to test empirically the role of diverse campaign law
institutions on policy positions of parties. Most concern has to be given to the
issue of potential endogeneity of the ban on corporate donations and practical
enforcement of campaign law provisions.
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3.6 Appendix: Tables
Table 3.5: Sources of data on institutions
Funding of Political Parties and Election
Campaigns
Austin and Tjernstro¨m (2003)
Party and Campaign Funding in Eastern Eu-
rope: A Study of 18 Member Countries of the
ACEEEO
Ikstens et al. (2001)
Money in politics: a study of party financing
practices in 22 countries
Bryan and Baer (2005)
Evaluation Report on Slovenia on Trans-
parency of Party Funding
GRECO (2007)
Evaluation Report on the United Kingdom
on Transparency of Party Funding
GRECO (2008b)
Evaluation Report on Luxembourg on the
Transparency of Party Funding
GRECO (2008a)
Evaluation Report on Turkey on Trans-
parency of Party Funding
GRECO (2010b)
Evaluation Report on Greece on Trans-
parency of Party Funding
GRECO (2010a)
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Table 3.6: A list of countries in the sample
ALBANIA GREECE NORTHERN IRELAND
AUSTRALIA HUNGARY NORWAY
AUSTRIA ICELAND POLAND
BELGIUM IRELAND PORTUGAL
BOSNIA ISRAEL ROMANIA
BULGARIA ITALY RUSSIA
CANADA JAPAN SERBIA
CROATIA LATVIA SLOVAKIA
CYPRUS LITHUANIA SLOVENIA
CZECH REPUBLIC LUXEMBOURG SPAIN
DENMARK MACEDONIA SWEDEN
ESTONIA MALTA SWITZERLAND
FINLAND MOLDOVA TURKEY
FRANCE NETHERLANDS UKRAINE
GERMANY NEW ZEALAND UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
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Table 3.7: 3SLS regression – The basic formulation
Dependent variable WPE
Coefficienta z-Stat.
Public Disclosure 18.23 (1.98)**
Ceiling on Contribu-
tions
-29.76 (-2.46)**
Direct Public Funding 9.26 (2.01)**
Equal Public Funding -14.84 (-1.46)
Ban on Corporate Do-
nations
35.78 (2.13)**
Ban on Corporate ×
Direct Public
-24.34 (-1.42)
Effective Number of
Parties
2.86 (1.87)**
Urban -0.31 (-1.05)
Constant 70.69 (3.20)***
Pseudo R2 0.26
Dependent variable Ceiling on Contributions
Coefficientb z-Stat.
WPE .03 (3.15)***
Tertiary Education -.01 (-1.90)*
Constant -2.20 (-2.60)***
Pseudo R2 0.34
Hansen–Sargan p–
value
0.55
No. of observations 46
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
bSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
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Table 3.8: Correlations between the explanatory variables
PDa DPFb BoCDc CoCd Ue
PD 1
DPF -.05 1
BoCD .17 .14 1
CoC .43 .04 .24 1
U -.02 -.13 .01 .44 1
aPublic Disclosure
bDirect Public Funding
cBan on Corporate Donations
dCeiling on Contributions
eUrbanization
Table 3.9: Correlations between the instruments, the measure of divergence and
the measures of governance quality
GEa CCb RLc
Weighted Party Extremism -0.48 -0.48 -0.45
Urbanization 0.46 0.47 0.41
Education 0.62 0.60 0.57
aGovernment effectiveness
bControl of corruption
cThe rule of law
122
Chapter 3. Campaign Finance Regulations and Policy Convergence: The Role of
Interest Groups and Valence
Table 3.10: 3SLS regression – Only well–developed countries
Dependent variable WPE
Coefficienta z-Stat.
Public Disclosure 16.33 (1.68)*
Ceiling on Contribu-
tions
-28.00 (-1.20)
Direct Public Funding 14.33 (2.08)**
Equal Public Funding 3.07 (0.29)
Ban on Corporate Do-
nations
40.92 (1.82)*
Ban on Corporate ×
Direct Public
-39.74 (-2.27)**
Effective Number of
Parties
2.34 (1.57)
Urban -0.28 (-0.78)
Constant 79.77 (2.30)**
Pseudo R2 0.27
Dependent variable Ceiling on Contributions
Coefficientb z-Stat.
WPE .04 (1.82)*
Tertiary Education -.01 (-1.00)
Constant -2.17 (-1.59)
Pseudo R2 0.33
Hansen–Sargan p–
value
0.10
No. of observations 27
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
bSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
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Table 3.11: 3SLS regression – Only proportional representation countries
Dependent variable WPE
Coefficienta z-Stat.
Public Disclosure 16.14 (1.40)
Ceiling on Contribu-
tions
-25.76 (-1.18)
Direct Public Funding 9.13 (1.98)**
Equal Public Funding -17.29 (-1.77)*
Ban on Corporate Do-
nations
10.80 (2.35)**
Ban on Corporate ×
Direct Public
Collinear
Effective Number of
Parties
3.11 (2.41)**
Urban -0.27 (-1.11)
Constant 66.30 (3.40)***
Pseudo R2 0.37
Dependent variable Ceiling on Contributions
Coefficientb z-Stat.
WPE .03 (3.14)***
Tertiary Education .01 (1.99)**
Constant -1.80 (-2.47)**
Pseudo R2 0.11
Hansen–Sargan p–
value
0.38
No. of observations 35
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
bSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
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Table 3.12: 3SLS regression – Ban on corporate donations excluded
Dependent variable WPE
Coefficienta z-Stat.
Public Disclosure 16.92 (1.81)*
Ceiling on Contribu-
tions
-20.02 (-1.09)
Direct Public Funding 7.40 (1.65)*
Equal Public Funding -10.09 (-0.96)
Effective Number of
Parties
1.44 (1.16)
Urban -0.22 (-0.84)
Constant 71.49 (3.24)***
Pseudo R2 0.26
Dependent variable Ceiling on Contributions
Coefficientb z-Stat.
WPE .03 (2.89)***
Tertiary Education .01 (1.88)*
Constant -2.33 (-2.44)**
Pseudo R2 0.40
Hansen–Sargan p–
value
0.36
No. of observations 46
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
bSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
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Chapter 4
The Failure of Direct Democracy
Implementation: Case Study of
Local Referenda in Poland
4.1 Introduction
Many transitional economies in Central and Eastern Europe provided direct
democratic instruments in their legal order. For example, both Hungary and Rus-
sia have included the right of citizens to exercise local self–government through
referenda in their constitutions . These countries introduced elements of di-
rect democracy as part of their reforms of public administration in the early
1990s, which was seen as an important part of the democratization process. The
most frequently applied instrument is the local referendum (Bucˇek and Smith
(2000)). Political science literature regard inducing electoral participation in lo-
cal decision–making as one way to induce democratic transition. Additionally,
the literature presents a number of arguments for why introduction of direct
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democracy instruments in transition countries should lead to improved economic
performance (e.g. Frey (2003)). Using example of the local referendum in Poland,
we wish to show that the sole fact of introducing direct decision–making on the
local level does not lead to the desired outcome, and in particular to an improved
economic performance. Our main goal in this paper is to identify reasons for
why the introduction of direct democracy in local fiscal decisions did not have
the expected and both theoretically and empirically well–grounded effect. We
believe that this ’failed’ experiment can provide meaningful policy insights re-
garding problem of attentive choice of economic details in constructing a legal
instrument.
Referendum on self–imposed taxation of municipality–dwellers is a specific
form of voters’ participation in fiscal decisions of local communities. The public
choice literature identified that instruments of direct democracy have an impor-
tant influence on various economic characteristics of countries or regions. Among
others, direct voter participation in fiscal decisions is believed to have a positive
impact on the efficiency of public goods provision as well as it decreases debt and
public expenditure. By means of public choice analysis we show that expected
efficiency gain in fiscal policy is not present and the effect of using local referenda
on expenditure is opposite from expected and this fact is directly related to high
cost of popular initiative and what follows low electoral control.
Reform of the public administration structure in 1999 in Poland was aimed
at transferring competence over a range of decisions, including fiscal ones to local
level administrative bodies and self–government authorities. Policies, including
provision of certain public services at most local levels are believed to be better
tailored to the needs of local communities than decisions made on the central
level.
128
Chapter 4. The Failure of Direct Democracy Implementation: Case Study of Local
Referenda in Poland
So far the administrative structure of the country is still highly centralized
and only a limited number of fiscal decisions are in the competence of local
authorities. Even a smaller number of issues can be resolved with the use of
direct democracy instruments such as a referendum or a popular initiative. At
the same time we observe a constant low level of residents’ interest in local self–
government activities and their participation in local decision–making. Out of
367 referenda on the dismissal of a member of a local administration held in years
1999–2010 a total of 317 were invalid because of too low a turnout at the polls. A
similar pattern has been observed for the case of popular initiatives. The number
as well as average turnout at the polls has been in constant decline as shown in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Local referenda 1999-2010 – turnout and validity
Year Number of referenda Average Turnout Valida
1999 16 25.95% 4
2000 108 18.86% 14
2001 70 17.79% 7
2002b 3 9.61% 0
2003 3 25.54% 1
2004 57 19.21% 9
2005 30 17.24% 2
2006 0 - 0
2007 2 26.64% 1
2008 35 18.83% 6
2009 32 18.37% 5
2010 10 14.64% 1
aReferendum on dismissal as well as on self–taxation is valid if turnout is higher than 30% of eligible voters
bObserved low number of referenda in 2002, 2003, 2006 and 2007 is due to local elections, that took place
in these years. According to article 5(2) of the local referendum act, a dismissal initiative can be commenced
not earlier than 10 months after beginning of the term of office of a local authority and not later than 8 months
before the end of it. Referenda on dismissal make up for most of referenda that took place during the analyzed
period.
We aim to analyze the institution of local referendum on self–imposed tax-
ation of residents, in the light of the above observations. It is the only legal
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instrument available to citizens that allows them to directly influence fiscal pol-
icy of municipalities. Although turnout for the case of self–taxation referenda was
on average higher than in other local primaries, a substantial fraction of these
was invalid.
Both the theoretical and the empirical literatures have found that institutions
of direct democracy have a clear and robust effect on economic outcomes on
the macro level. Several authors analyzed both referenda and public initiatives
and found that the right of citizens to directly decide on political and economic
issues affects levels of fiscal expenditure, public debt, tax compliance and many
more. For example, Matsusaka (1995) found that U.S. states, in which fiscal
decisions are subject to popular initiative, have lower expenditures and lower
revenues. Similarly, for Switzerland, Feld et al. (2001) find that cantons with
mandatory referenda on fiscal issues are characterized by spending and revenue
lower by 7% to 11% compared to those in which no direct democracy instrument
is present. The question of efficiency improvement related to direct democracy
was, among others, addressed by Alt and Lassen (2003) and Pommerehne (1990).
These studies show that institutions of direct democracy relate to lower level of
corruption and increased efficiency of public goods provision.
We wish to test whether empirical regularities regarding the economic impact
of direct democracy found in other studies, such as the effect on local expenditure
and the efficiency of the provision of public goods are also present in our case.
A vast majority of literature considers direct democracy institutions in USA and
Switzerland, countries of federal structure and characterized with traditionally
high electoral participation in local decision–making. Local referenda on self–
imposed taxation in Poland, may be considered a direct democracy ’experiment’
in a country, with until recently highly centralized public administration and
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most importantly low interest for politics on both the national and local levels.
The economic effects of voters’ participation in local fiscal decisions might have
opposite effect under these significantly different socio–political conditions. Ac-
cording to our knowledge this is the first study, that tries to assess economic
effects of direct democracy decision–making in Central Europe. We decided to
use a case study form, rather than a cross–country analysis to be able to conduct
a deeper study of practical implementation of direct democracy. Rodriguez-Pose
and Kroijer (2009) argue on a basis of data provided by the United Nations that
in comparison to other countries in the area Poland is in an advanced stage of
fiscal decentralization reform. We believe that deepen analysis of factors that
might create fiscal outcomes unforeseen by the legislative body could serve as an
experience worthwhile as policy advice for other countries in the region. Section
4.2 comprises presentation of legal provisions and associated interpretation of le-
gal regulations, that form a basis of our analysis. We focus on elements that have
direct impact on the discussed issues, that is required majority and subjective
scope of referendum, interpretation of tax obligation and issues related to popular
initiative. In section 4.3 we turn to analyzing implications of various aspects of
local referendum from the public choice perspective. In particular we make use of
a spatial model of voting to formulate testable hypotheses. Section 4.4 presents
results of our empirical study of impact of direct democracy on expenditure level.
Section 4.5 concludes and discusses the results.
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4.2 Legal Provisions Concerning Referendum on
Self–Imposed Taxation in Poland
According to the act on local referendum1 it is a mandatory institution, whenever
municipality wishes to introduce a tax aimed at providing a public good or service,
which is a part of it’s own tasks. In particular, it is most often used whenever
municipality wishes to introduce a public waste disposal service. This issue fulfills
conditions under which a referendum on self–imposed taxation can be convened.
It is according to the law, a part of what is mentioned as ”keeping the commune
area clean” and is a part of municipality’s own tasks but at the same time it is
not obligatory. Thus, this kind of service (and also diverse other services most
often concerning environmental issues) can, as foreseen by the cited legal acts,
be provided publicly (by the local government) but it is not obligatory. In other
words it is in the competence of local community members, to decide whether
they wish to have their refuse disposed of by means of public service or not.
Apart from waste disposal, public provision of diverse services can be decided
upon via a referendum, as long as they qualify to be a part of commune’s own
tasks in light of self–government regulations. According to the above cited legal
provisions, municipalities’ authorities are obliged to decide on self–taxation via
a referendum, in which voters will decide on imposing on themselves a payment.
Citizens are also empowered to the right of initiative to propose levying this form
1All provisions described in this section can be found in the following legal acts:
the act on local referendum (Polish Journal of Laws 2000.88.985), the act on local self–
government (1990.16.95), the act on keeping the municipality area clean (1996.132.622),
judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of Poland SA/Wr 1171/93 and resolu-
tion NSA FPK 15/97 of this court, the tax obligation statute (1996.75.357), the act on
enforcement proceedings in public administration (1991.36.161), the act on proceedings
in administrative courts (153.1270) and the Constitution of Republic of Poland.
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of taxation on themselves. An initiative can be issued by a minimum of 10% of
commune residents. A required majority for the decision about self–taxation to
be binding is 2/3 of commune’s population with participation of at least 30%
of voters entitled to vote. In this, we may name the referendum in question
semi–binding, with three outcomes possible:
1. A referendum is invalid, if turnout is lower than 30%.
2. A referendum is inconclusive, whenever none of the possibilities is given
consent from over 2/3 of voters.
3. A referendum is valid, conclusive and binding, if one of the options receives
more then 2/3 of votes.
An outcome of a referendum is only binding in the third of the enumerated
cases, of which the interesting one is when members of the community decide
for provision of a service by the local government. Moreover, a local referendum
law directly stipulates this form of decision making only on the municipality
level. Thus, a contrario not during fiscal decisions undertaken in voivodeships
(provinces) or counties. It is therefore an instrument used only in decision–making
at the most local level.
Although the law itself uses the notion of ’taxation’ to describe the process of
collecting money from the community to be spent on a public issue, the Supreme
Administrative Court of Poland, addressed the question of whether it is indeed
possible to treat this sort of payment as a tax, and therefore execute it’s collection
. The main interpretational problem associated with self–taxation of municipal-
ities, which has been addressed by the Supreme Administrative Court lies in the
fact, that according to the Constitution of Republic of Poland:
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”The imposition of taxes, as well as other public imposts, the speci-
fication of those subject to the tax and the rates of taxation, as well
as the principles for granting tax reliefs and remissions, along with
categories of taxpayers exempt from taxation, shall be by means of
statute.”
The earlier judgement states that self–taxation of municipalities bears all the
features necessary to be considered a tax in the sense of public law doctrine, as it
is among other characteristics a unilateral, compulsory public impost. This view
is also shared by certain legal scholars (see, e.g. Czaplicki et al. (2007)). In this,
according to the ruling, it is possible to execute it’s collection on a basis of tax
obligation statute. However, according to the subsequent resolution, a commune
is not entitled to set up a tax other than enumerated in the law (referring to the
above cited constitutional norm), either by a public initiative or by a decision
made by local authorities. In this, municipalities can decide via a mandatory
referendum on gathering funds for a public aim, but the funding does not bear
required features allowing it to be considered a tax. According to Ninard (1998)
it is still possible to execute collection of it on a basis of other acts but in practice
it might be significantly hindered. Also, the latter opinion is only a view of a
legal scholar, and there exists no legally binding interpretation in favor of it.
The position taken by the Supreme Administrative Court in it’s resolution also
finds support among part of legal scholars (see e.g. Brzezin´ski (1995)). For the
purpose of further analysis we will assume that municipalities are not vested
with a legal instrument to be able to effectively execute collection of a payment
levied by means of self–taxation as interpreted in the most recent opinion of the
Supreme Administrative Court. In our opinion, the above cited resolution is the
most direct reason for the low number of local fiscal referenda. Municipalities
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left without a practical measure of execution of tax obligation would rationally
not bear the cost of conducting it.
4.3 Theoretical Assessment
4.3.1 Expenditure and Direct Democracy – the Base–Line
Model
We base our analysis of the effect of referendum on expenditure level on a spatial
model developed by Feld and Matsusaka (2003), which we adapt to the fact
that the majority required in the referendum equals 2/3. This is also the base–
line theoretical formulation used in regressions analyzing the impact of direct
democracy on spending. Additionally, for clarity of exposition, we will assume
that the preferences of residents are uniformly distributed on the [0, 2M ] interval,
where M denotes the level of spending preferred by the median voter. Here, we
briefly describe the structure of the model. The utility from the level of spending
of a median voter is defined as an absolute deviation, that is
U(Exp. Level) = −|X − Exp.Level|,
where X denotes the ideal level of spending.2. Under these assumptions, the
median voter preferes the spending level M . Figure 4.1 presents a graphical
presentation of the spatial model of Feld and Matsusaka (2003).
The model is based on the assumption that the government (in our case a
2Spatial models usually assume decreasing rather than constant marginal utility
e.g. U(Exp. Level) = −(X − Exp.Level)2. We use this formulation for the clarity
of exposition, whereas all the implications also hold for the typical quadratic utility
function.
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Figure 4.1: Spatial model of expenditure
local governing body) is willing to spend more than the median voter would do.
This assumption is grounded on findings of among others, Romer and Rosenthal
(1978). We shall turn to description of details of their findings an application of
it later on. It is reasonable to assume that also in the analyzed case governing
bodies wish to spend more than the median voter would. This is also confirmed
in the empirical part of the study in the next section. The left end of the axis
corresponds to 0 level of tax and expenditure, which in our case is also the status
quo level. Point M denotes the ideal level of spending of the median voter and G
is the level of spending desired by local authorities. If no mandatory referendum
was in place, the local government would be free to choose any spending level
that it desires, being only threatened by a possibility of being recalled from of-
fice. With a mandatory referendum present the situation is quite different. Under
simple majority rule the spending level, which would be accepted by at least half
of commune’s population corresponds to point 2M , this is twice as high as the
ideal of the median voter. Under the assumption that preferences of voters are
uniformly distributed, it is at the same time the level of spending corresponding
to ideal of voter with the preference for the highest spending level. Thus, under
the reasonable assumption that the ideal of the authority lies within borders of
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preferences in the community, nothing is practically changed and the governing
body can still choose it’s desired level of spending. Under 2/3 majority rule the
situation is more favorable from the perspective of the median voter. The maxi-
mal spending level accepted by 2/3 of the residents is the one corresponding to the
ideal of voter with preference in 2/3 of the distance between the status quo and
the location of voter with the preference for the highest spending. With uniformly
distributed preferences it corresponds to level of spending equaling 4M/3. It is
therefore lower than under simple majority rule. Another instrument envisaged in
the law on local referendum is a popular initiative. Voters are allowed to propose
their desired level of taxation and spending, and this proposal is then subject to
a referendum. Initiative is not costless. It involves gathering signatures – in the
analyzed case 10% of commune’s members’ signatures are required. However, in
our case, it does not comprise the costs of holding a referendum, which is accord-
ing to the law financed in any case by the local government. We denote by C
the cost of gathering the required number of signatures. Note that any proposal
located within the [2M/3, 4M/3] segment will be accepted by at least 2/3 of the
municipality population (dashed area in figure 4.1). Assuming that the proposal
is issued by the median voter and including the cost, the level of spending in an
initiative will equal M+C. The level of spending proposed by the local authority
will depend on the cost of initiative, and equal max{M +C, 4M/3}, so whenever
C > 4M/3 it is possible that level of spending will be higher under initiative than
under mandatory referendum.
These results hold only if the authority has higher willingness to spend than
residents of the municipality. As results of Pommerehne and Kirchga¨ssner (1991)
show, this need not be necessarily the case. Data on various characteristics for
local self–imposed taxation referenda (Table 4.2) show that the general level of
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support is very high. Only in case of 4 valid referenda, support for provision
of public service was lower than the required 2/3 of votes. In only one case
2/3 of voters decided against a public service, which made this decision binding.
As shown in the empirical section, the level of spending is on average higher in
municipalities in which referenda where held compared to the control sample.
These facts strongly suggest that most of communities’ residents once given the
option to agree on taxation are in favor of it. This observation is in accordance
with the findings of Pommerehne and Kirchga¨ssner (1991), who state that growth
of public expenditure is strongly determined by demand factors. At the same
time, until 2010 there was no case of a successful initiative concerning the same
kind of issue. In the next subsection we turn our attention to how this relation
can be explained by a high cost of initiative.
4.3.2 Cost of initiative
During the analyzed period there was no case of a self–taxation initiative. This
observation is puzzling regarding the high support for self–taxation encountered
in municipalities that held referenda. One economic conclusion that can be made
is that the cost of initiative is so high that it outweighs the perceived benefits
from self–taxation. The 10% requirement seems not to be practically feasible
in communes larger than several thousand residents. The largest communes in
Poland, including big cities have up to 1.5 million residents, in which 39 communes
have over 100.000 inhabitants. The signature requirement of 10% of communes’
members, in case of larger communes means collecting 70.000–100.000 signatures.
This is about the same as a nationwide popular initiative requirement of 100.000
signatures. Data of Piasecki (2005) on popular initiatives on removal of local
authorities from office at the commune level show that the maximum number of
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votes ever collected on a municipality level equaled slightly over 30.000.
An additional cost associated with public initiative arises from the law on local
referendum itself. It states that costs of informing the public about the planned
referendum, it’s aim, time and related issues is to be borne by the initiator of a
referendum, in this case the residents of the commune. Thus, a group of residents
interested in spreading the information about their desired issue is obliged to
bear all the costs of information. This aspect further weakens the possibility of
a successful initiative already at the municipality level.
The fact that a popular initiative is characterized by a very high cost has
an important implication on agenda setting. In the analyzed case, a popular
initiative is virtually impossible, because of high costs of signature collection.
This creates a form of ’barrier to entry’ in the formulation of proposals other
than suggested by the local authority. As a consequence, the local authority
excerises a quasi–monopoly power over agenda setting. Romer and Rosenthal
(1978) find that, in case the status quo level of expenditure is lower than the
median voter’s ideal, there is a negative relationship between the status quo and
the level of expenditure that solves the agenda setter’s problem. In other words
a monopolist agenda setter can exploit the voters by proposing a very high level
of spending in case the status quo is far from what is preferred by the population.
Romer and Rosenthal (1978) obtain a paradoxical result that in certain cases a
majority of voters can be better off and allocative efficiency may be more nearly
achieved when the setter can impose a tax without voter approval. This result and
the following argumentation of Feld and Matsusaka (2003), which we presented in
the previous subsection makes us believe that, despite high support for the public
service voters are not necessarily better off in communes, which held referenda on
provision of public service. We will turn back to deeper analysis of this problem
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in light of the above described theoretical findings in the empirical section.
4.3.3 Required Majority and Geographical Scope
One of the key public choice arguments for collective decision–making is that it
can help improve on efficiency whenever market failures are present. However,
Pareto improvement associated with the decision is guaranteed only if it is made
unanimously. Whenever the required majority is less than 100%, it is possible
that certain individuals are made worse off than under the status quo. The dif-
ference between utilities of individuals gained from a policy set under unanimity
and under any other majority rule, has been identified by Buchanan and Tullock
(1962) as external costs of the decision rule. At the same time, unanimity itself
is associated with a high cost. The optimal majority is the one for which the sum
of the costs is the lowest (Mueller (2003)). According to Buchanan and Tullock
(1962) the decision–time cost of achieving a required majority rises with increas-
ing size of the community involved in decision–making process. It shall also rise
with decreasing access to information about the particular decision in question.
The act on local referendum stipulates a 2/3 majority required in order for the
result of a referendum to be binding. This, in connection with the fact that the
referendum is stipulated only for the most local level of administrative division
suggests that the legislator is aware of the above pointed out arguments. On the
national level a majority of 2/3 is reserved for matters of highest importance, e.g.
amendments to the constitution, in order to protect the minority from sharply
rising external costs of the decision rule. On the local level, the legislator assumes
that due to small community size and what follows relative homogeneity of pref-
erences, decision–time costs should be sufficiently low and that gain in utility
of individuals acquired by high supermajority outbalances them. By restricting
140
Chapter 4. The Failure of Direct Democracy Implementation: Case Study of Local
Referenda in Poland
usage of the local referendum on self–imposed taxation only to decisions in the
smallest units of administrative division, legislator tries to assure that such a
requirement is practically feasible to achieve and at the same time that a cost of
carrying out a referendum is low. However, as argued by Mueller (1996) there
is no practical reason for which a required majority to pass a bill in a process
of referendum should be different than the majority required for the same type
of legislation when discussed in a legislative body, in this case a local council.
A commune council in most cases adopts resolutions on diverse types of local
taxes, including issues related to waste disposal and environment protection by
simple majority under presence of at least half of the members. It is not clear
why the legislator makes such a distinction between the majority required in the
local council and the same type of fiscal issue decided in a referendum. If we
apply technical arguments presented above to fiscal–decision making in the coun-
cil, and under the assumption that make–up of the council reflects preferences of
the commune, which is a valid assumption in a multiparty, proportional system,
we must conclude that consistency of the law as well as efficiency considerations
would require adopting a 2/3 majority rule in council decisions on local taxes.
4.4 Empirical Assessment
4.4.1 Data
Data concerning participation and results of local referenda were obtained on
a basis of protocols published in Voivodeship Official Journals since 2000. They
comprise results of 27 local referenda on self–imposed taxation held in 10 provinces
in different parts of the country. Data on demographic and economic characteris-
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tics of each commune were gathered from commune–level reports from a national
census conducted by the Central Statistical Office in 2002. Data on expenditures
of municipalities on refuse collection and subventions from the central budget
were obtained from the Regional Data Bank of The Central Statistical Office.
All the other information regarding characteristics of communes and their inhab-
itants were gathered from the Public Information Bulletin (BIP) and the Official
Journal of the State Election Commission.
Local referenda were first introduced in 1990 in the act on local self–government
and then later on in the act on local referendum, which constituted more specific
features of this form of local decision–making. Despite a long presence in Polish
legal system, it has so far not been often used. Data on local referenda conducted
are available only for the period 2000–2010, for the act on local–referendum stipu-
lated mandatory publication of communes’ resolutions on conduction of referenda
in voivodship official journal only in the year 2000.
4.4.2 Expenditure on refuse removal
Empirical studies have shown that directly democratic decision–making on fiscal
issues is associated with lower budget debt and expenditure. Similarly direct
democracy has been related to higher efficiency in the provision of public ser-
vice. Studies, which are most closely related to problem analyzed in this paper
are Pommerehne (1983) and Pommerehne (1990). These works deal with direct
democracy effect on waste collection in Swiss towns and found that it is provided
at lowest cost in those with private contractor and direct democratic elements.
Similarly, Feld et al. (2001) found that net cantonal general level of expendi-
ture is lower in Swiss cantons with direct democracy. In Swiss and American
examples, particular cantons or states are characterized by a long tradition of
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Table 4.2: Local referenda turnout and results – descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Urban communes
Turnout in % 47.58 12.27 36.04 61.27
% of YES votes 72.83 13.53 53.01 83.51
No. of inhabitantsa 16673.25 19259.22 4391 45021
No. of inhabitants per electoral district 1433.93 354.31 1097.75 1875.87
Approx. distance to polling placeb 1.11 0.46 0.65 1.73
Urban–rural communes
Turnout in % 27.15 7.72 17.87 37.46
% of YES votes 64.94 22.92 23.82 94.88
No. of inhabitants 19265.38 11539.56 8224 39601
No. of inhabitants per electoral district 1279.64 255.14 944.25 1652.8
Approx. distance to polling place 1.95 0.45 1.43 2.81
Rural communes
Turnout in % 39.73 10.57 17.59 53.84
% of YES votes 83.50 13.13 48.73 98.61
No. of inhabitants 7007.6 4390.35 2666 16015
No. of inhabitants per electoral district 834.59 224.09 561.55 1333
Approx. distance to polling place 2.32 0.7 1.34 3.59
aNumber of inhabitants of the commune entitled to vote.
bIn kilometers. Obtained by first dividing area of the commune by the number of electoral districts in it
and subsequently finding a radius of a circle of equal area.
a certain decision–making procedure. For example, the state of South Dakota
adopted initiative and referendum in 1898 and in the second – Oregon these were
adopted in 1902. The action of holding a referendum in Poland and other tran-
sitional democracies might be, on the other hand rather an endogenous variable
and an instrument of gathering additional funding for commune’s own tasks.
We base this supposition on findings of Romer and Rosenthal (1978), which
we already described in the previous subsection. Whenever an expenditure–
maximizing agenda–setter prefers a high level of spending he can make use of a
referendum as a budget expansion device. In our case, the status–quo of zero tax
and zero expenditure on the public service, as shown by generally high level of
support in analyzed referenda is not desired by the majority of voters. In these
conditions strong monopoly power of the local authority over the agenda can be
practically used. There is a justified suspicion that the decision to kick–off a
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referendum is endogenous with regard to both political affiliation of the council
members as well as characteristics of the municipality.
Political affiliation has been found to determine the level of taxation in general
and that left–wing governments tend to propose higher tax rates. Whereas some
authors argue that partisan politics play little if any role on the national level, e.g.
Haan and Sturm (1994) and others pose that ideological differences are important
in determining public policy. In this view left–wing political parties are believed
to be more in favor of income redistribution than right–wing parties. In terms
of the level of taxation, it is expected that a left–wing government will be more
favorable towards a higher tax burden. On the local level, this issue has not
been extensively analyzed yet and in particular we are not aware of any study
for transition economies. In more mature democracies studies of, among other
Allers et al. (2001) for the Netherlands and Borge (1995) for Norway, find that
the tax burden is higher in municipalities governed by left–wing authorities. If we
believe that left–wing governments are willing to spend more, the hypothesis that
referendum is used as an instrument to enlarge disposable local budget will be
justified if we find that left–wing councils hold referenda more often than others.
Hypothesis 1 Left–wing self–governments hold referenda more often.
Hypothesis 2 The level of expenditure on refuse removal is higher in munici-
palities that held referenda on self–imposed taxation.
If we find evidence to confirm the above hypotheses, it will be a strong sugges-
tion that monopoly power over agenda–setting, which is a result of high initiative
cost leads to the use of a local referendum as device to enlarge budgets rather
than is driven by efficiency concerns. Moreover, if we find support for the second
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hypothesis, it would mean that the are indeed no efficiency gains in terms costs
of refuse collection.
In order to be able to consistently estimate the impact of the referenda we
need to treat decision to hold a referndum as endogenous in the regressions. In
particular we decided to use a treatment effects model, described in detail below.
In order to estimate the effect of treatment we gathered a sample of control
observations. We paired each commune in a treatment sample with a similar one,
of the same type (urban, rural or mixed) and located in the same county. By this
and controlling for diverse characteristics of municipalities we hope to be able
to analyze communes, which are very much similar. We believe that location in
the same county reasonably well captures the effect of geographical, demographic
and sociological characteristics of communes, which we do not take directly into
consideration. The data are for years 2001-2009, whereas in treated communes
referenda took place in years between these two dates. Therefore, treatment is
also analyzed referring to the same commune in the pre–referendum period. We
denote a commune as post–referendum only in the next year after referendum
took place, to account for time needed to adjust local budgets. The sample
of treatment and control observations constitutes a panel of 486 observations.
To additionally control for potential differences in communes’ characteristics we
estimate a version of a model with commune level fixed effects.
We specify a two–equation treatments effect model, in which of primary in-
terest is the referendum effect on expenditure, thus regression
yj = xjβ + δzj + εj (4.1)
in which
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yj – expenditure on refuse collection,
zj – dummy denoting post–referendum years, i.e. treatment,
xj – a set of controls affecting the level of spending.
The binary decision to obtain the treatment zj is modeled as the outcome of
an unobserved latent variable, z∗j . It is assumed that z
∗
j is a linear function of
the exogenous covariates wj and a random component uj . More specifically,
z∗j = wjγ + uj (4.2)
and the observed zj is
zj =
1, if z
∗
j > 0
0, otherwise
 (4.3)
.
εj and uj are assumed bivariate normal with
εj
uj
 ∼ N

0
0
 ,
σ2 ρσ
ρσ 1


.
Equations are estimated using full maximum likelihood with robust standard
errors. Since we analyze panel data, we estimate both a pooled regression and one
with municipalities’ fixed effects. Using general–to–specific variable selection we
started estimation with the same set of independent variables for both equations.
These are summarized in Table 4.3.
Population size, population density, level of income and external subsidies
per capita have been identified in the literature as having effect on the level of
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Table 4.3: Treatment effects model – description of variables
Variable name Description
Expenditure Yearly expenditure on refuse collection per
capita
Population Population of a municipality
Density Density of population per square km.
Income Average per capita income of residents
Subventions Yearly subventions received by the munici-
pality from outside sources per capita
URBAN Dummy indicating a municipality being de-
fined as urban
LEFT Dummy indicating if majority in commune
council is held by members of a leftist party
ELECTION A dummy for years in which local election
took place
EU A dummy for years after access to the Euro-
pean Community
Year Trend effect
local spending (see, e.g. Pommerehne (1983), Feld et al. (2001)) or in particular
as affecting costs of refuse removal (see Hirsch (1965) and Bodkin and Conklin
(1971)). A dummy for urban municipalities reflects different nature of refuse
removal in rural and urban areas. Expenditure might also rise in a year preced-
ing local election, as argued in political budget cycles literature (e.g. Shi and
Svensson (2006), Galli and Rossi (2002)). Access to the European Community
in 2004 is associated with more strict rules concerning protection of the environ-
ment therefore it could positively affect expenditure on the national level, but
reports show that due to access to external funding most of these do not have to
be borne by local governments anymore. The final model results are presented
in Table 4.4
For the purpose of comparison we present below in Table 4.5 results of OLS
regression with robust standard errors of the expenditure equation with the same
set of independent variables.
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Table 4.4: Local referendum effect on refuse collection costs – treatment effects
model
Pooled Fixed Effects
Variable Coefficient z-Stat.a Coefficient z-Stat.
Expenditure
equation
Population -0.0008 (-4.15)*** -0.0007 (-3.77)***
Income 0.0303 (4.87)*** 0.0306 (4.93)***
Subventions 0.009 (8.53)*** 0.009 (8.34)***
URBAN = 1 16.1963 (3.87)*** 16.4742 (3.93)***
EU = 1 -8.1230 (-2.45)** -8.1518 (-2.47)**
TREATMENT = 1 49.9291 (8.38)*** 50.2054 (8.38)***
Const. -30.1538 (-3.17)*** -27.1128 (-2.81)***
Selection
equation
LEFT = 1 0.3761 (1.99)** 0.3475 (1.84)**
Population 0.0002 (2.15)** 0.0001 (2.19)**
Income 0.0004 (1.72)* 0.0004 (1.76)*
Const. -390.5098 (-7.22)*** -390.4728 (-7.22)***
ρ -0.6543 -0.6534
σ 34.26102 34.1476
Wald Test
H0 : ρ = 0
χ2(1) = 13.34 χ2(1) = 12.78
Prob > χ2 = 0.0003 Prob > χ2 = 0.0003
No. of obs. 486
aSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
Table 4.5: Impact of referendum on waste collection expenditure – OLS regression
results
Dependent variable Expenditure
Coefficientab t-Stat.
Population -0.0016 (-6.76)***
Area 0.0683 (2.64)***
Income 0.0375 (5.38)***
Subventions -0.001 (3.48)***
URBAN = 1 21.9528 (3.46)***
EU = 1 -1.2241 (-0.42)
TREATMENT = 1 17.5093 (4.91)***
Const. -34.8242 (-3.60)***
R2 = 0.27
No. of obs. 486
aResults with Robust Standard Errors
bSignificance: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
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As we may observe from comparison on the coefficient on referendum effect on
expenditure in Tables 4.5 and 4.4, coefficient obtained with OLS severely underes-
timates the impact of referendum on level of expenditure. This finding also sheds
new light on similar results for other, in particular developing and transitional
countries. Direct democracy instruments’ choice turns out to be endogenous in
case of Poland. Therefore, similar studies for transitional countries, with low
level of electoral participation in local politics might be subject to endogeneity
bias.
Not all variables that we conjectured should impact expenditures turned out
significant. The size of population, the income of residents and the level of ex-
ternal subsidies have signs consistent with the literature on local expenditure
determinants. Partisan and pre–election effects also do not play a role in ex-
plaining level of expenditure on waste removal, which in this case is justified as
this type of expenditure is not be directly related to opportunistic political bud-
get cycles. Results of estimation of the selection equation show that authorities
of richer and bigger communes are more willing to hold a referendum on self–
taxation. This relation has been noticed by Piasecki (2005), who however did
not analyze this in a formal way. Among the variables significant in the selection
equation, we observe a positive effect of leftist commune councils for proposing
self–taxation referenda. This result supports hypothesis 1.
Striking result is the effect of referendum on the level of expenditure. It is
strongly positive and significant. Communes that conducted a referendum, and
voters supported state–provided collection of garbage spend on average much
more than these in the control sample. It is obvious that direct public spending
on collection of refuse from households should increase once this task is performed
with public money. The measure of expenditure used in regressions, comprises
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however the overall level of expenditure on cleaning activities. Thus, it includes
also costs associated with getting rid of waste illegally disposed of by residents,
who did not privately contract collection of their garbage, costs of free-riding and
associated negative externalities. If there were efficiency gains from collective
decision–making in this case, these should be captured by the overall decrease
in spending level, which is not the case in our study. Hypothesis 2, therefore
also finds reflection in the empirical study. Overall, the fact that leftist local
governments hold referenda more often and that the level of spending increases
as a result leads to formulation of a following proposition.
Proposition 1 As a result of high costs of popular initiative local fiscal refer-
enda in Poland do not generate efficiency improvements and serve as a device to
enlarge local budgets.
Under weak electoral control, funding gathered by means of self–taxation
might be used for purposes different than financing refuse collection, but this
statement suggesting fraudulent use of resources gathered with the use of self–
taxation associated with leftist government would require further studies. These
results resemble the example of referenda in Oregon school districts (analyzed
by e.g. Romer and Rosenthal (1979)), in which authorities use the instrument of
referendum to receive larger budgets, while leaving voters with either expenditure
level higher than optimal or very low, or in some cases even zero. With low citizen
participation in the political process and related weak control of government
decisions, the already identified effect of information access, the high cost of
popular initiative and apparent relation between leftist local governments and
endogenous decision to hold a referendum on fiscal matters the conclusion must
be drawn that referenda rather serve bureaucrats expand their budgets than bring
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the spending level closer to the socially desired outcome or the median voter ideal
level.
4.5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to identify and analyze factors that decided that
introduction of direct democracy in fiscal decisions in Poland does not lead to
improvement in electoral participation in political decisions and electoral control
over partisan politics and what follows does not lead to increase in efficiency of
fiscal decisions at the local level. By means of analysis of legal provisions and
practical interpretation of the act on local referendum with the use of public
choice theory, we identified a number of components that lead to preclusion of
use of it as an instrument of increasing public participation in political decisions.
Using as a baseline a spatial model of voting we make two conclusions about
the cost of popular initiative. First, the high cost of initiative is one of the factors
that lead to higher spending on municipal level. This effect arises because vot-
ers are unable to effectively control self–government decisions as the threat of a
popular initiative, which would turn down level of spending proposed by local au-
thorities, is not credible. Whenever local government’s desired spending is higher
than the socially optimal level, which we assume to be the median voter outcome,
it is only constrained by the mandatory referendum requirement. We also find
that the effect of potential for increased spending is slightly eased by high super-
majority requirement. The high supermajority requirement in the referendum,
though inconsistent with majority requirements for similar issues discussed in the
local council, in connection with the limited geographical scope of self–taxation
referendum has to be assessed positively. An efficiency oriented legislator, by
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this provisions tries to assure efficiency gains at the same time limiting internal
costs of decision–making, which increase with the size of community. Thus, from
purely theoretical point of view this seems a correct solution.
Unlike other studies, which analyze impact of direct democracy on spending
we do not find a decrease in the level of expenditure on communal level. The
opposite, use of referenda is found to be associated with overall higher level of
spending than in the sample which is used as control. We wanted to account for
the fact that referenda in the case of a transitional country with low electoral
participation and political culture could be used by bureaucrats as an instrument
of budget expansion. Therefore, we treated decision of holding a referendum as
endogenous. Results of our studies show that partisan politics seems to play
a role in decision on conducting a referendum. Comparison of treatment effects
model with OLS estimates shows that the endogeneity hypothesis is justified. We
conclude that on average higher spending in municipalities that used referenda is
associated with the observed partisan effect. This result also sheds new light on
similar OLS regressions ran for other countries, which might also be subject to
endogeneity bias. The overall level of spending rises in the treatment group, and
from this fact we may conjecture that the efficiency gain from collective decision
is not present. We are aware that there are various issues related to nature of
exclusion for a service of waste disposal and associated negative externalities, and
this topic is subject to further research.
There are diverse ways issues raised in this study can be further analyzed. So
far, we focused on only a few aspects of direct democracy impact on economic
performance. We did not test whether other economic outcomes associated with
direct democracy, and most importantly tax morale level, are also present in case
of Poland. The unclear status of tax obligation of self–imposed taxation natu-
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rally seems to preclude decreased tax evasion, but this question without a formal
analysis is still open. Moreover, due to lack of individual–level data we are not
able to assess preferences of the median voter in the analyzed communes, so the
argumentation relies on the assumption that the optimal spending level is indeed
lower than the one preferred by the authority. Since, as we stated in the intro-
duction work on direct democracy institutions in transitional countries is scarce,
it is worthwhile to analyze whether similar economic phenomena are observed in
other countries of the region. The overall effect of referenda on fiscal policy of
the municipalities is a combination of institutional features and the low interest
of voters in politics. A single country case study does not allow us to answer
the question of which of the two components is more important for the obtained
results. A next step to be taken is a cross–country comparison of similar institu-
tions for other countries in the region. The most interesting problem related to
findings of this paper is the issue of endogeneity of a choice of referendum as a
fiscal policy–making instrument. We believe that in conditions of weak electoral
control and low public interest for politics as observed in transitional countries,
one should analyze in a broader way the question of strategic choice of political
institutions and their impact of fiscal outcomes.
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English Version
The following thesis is a compilation of four papers that analyze diverse aspects
of spatial models. Three of them deal with a spatial model of parliamentary
elections, whereas in the fourth one we implement a spatial model of voting to
analyze the impact of direct democracy on fiscal decisions.
In chapter one we present a comprehensive analysis of the Polish parliamen-
tary elections in 2007 and subsequent formation of the coalitional government
and it’s policy choice from the public choice perspective. On the basis of equilib-
rium predictions of the valence model we find that for two parties the Downsian
behavior is not likely. Moreover, on a basis of the rational voter theory we con-
clude that abstentions had an unequal effect on the election results of particular
parties. Second part of the empirical study deals with the coalitional behavior,
and again we find non–Downsian behavior of the LiD party. The uncovered set
and the Schattschneider set are analyzed in comparison with the pension system
reform conducted in 2007-2009. It turns out that theoretical predictions made
with the use of cooperative game theoretical concepts correspond well to the
actual policy choice.
In the second chapter we show how the choice of methodology for the esti-
Abstract
mation of party positions impacts the conclusions about equilibrium positions of
parties in a spatial model. We find that for the same set of voters’ ideal points
we should observe either divergence or convergence to the mean, depending on
the choice of party positions’ estimates.
In the third chapter we test the impact of campaign finance regulations, intro-
duced to decrease the influence of special interest groups on parties’ platforms.
On a basis of predictions of the valence model and using a cross–country sample
of 47 countries, we find that public funding of parties leads to divergence in plat-
forms along the main electoral axis, whereas ceilings on individual contributions
cause platforms to converge. These effects are caused by the impact of differences
in valence among the parties. We also find unexpected divergence related to a
ban on corporate donations and the public disclosure of income statements.
The final chapter contains an analysis of local referendum on self–imposed
taxation in Poland. We provide a detailed description of this direct democracy
institution. Moreover, we assess its consequences with regard to the fiscal policy
of communes. On the base of the high costs of initiative and the low access
to information on the side of the public, we argue that such a referendum does
not lead to increased voter participation in local decision–making. Moreover, we
find that due to the high costs of initiative, local authorities are given a de facto
monopoly power over the agenda–setting. As a result, the considered referendum
does not lead to a more efficient provision of public service, but serves as a mean
of budget expansion for bureaucrats.
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German Version
Bei der vorgelegten Arbeit handelt es sich um kumulative Dissertation. Sie
besteht aus vier Essays die unterschiedliche Aspekte der politischen O¨konomie
beleuchten. Jeder Essay entspricht einem Kapitel. Die ersten drei Kapitel be-
fassen sich mit ra¨umlichen Wettbewerb bei Parlamentswahlen. Das letzte Kapitel
analysiert den Einfluss direkter Demokratie auf fiskalpolitische Entscheidungen
im Modell ra¨umlichen Wettbewerbs.
Das erste Kapitel entha¨lt eine umfassende Analyse der polnischen Parla-
mentswahlen in 2007 und der nachfolgenden Koalitionsverhandlungen. Zielset-
zung ist mit Hilfe eines Modells ra¨umlichen Wettbewerbs den Ausgang der Koali-
tionsverhandlungen zu prognostizieren. Der este Teil bescha¨ftigt sich mit dem
Wahlergebnis. Ausgehend von Prognosen des Valence-Modells stellt sich her-
aus, dass zumindest fu¨r zwei Parteien die Downs’ Hypothese nicht zutreffend ist.
Geht man von der Hypothese rationalen Wahlverhaltens aus, zeichnet sich auer-
dem ab, dass Stimmenthaltungen sich unterschiedlich auf den Wahlerfolg einzel-
ner Parteien auswirken. Der zweite Teil versucht eine Prognose des Ausgangs
der Koalitionsverhandlungen. Im Falle der LiD Partei ist strategisch Verhalten
ho¨chstwahrscheinlich. Der abschlieende Teil behandelt die Reform des Renten-
versicherungssystems von 2007 bis 2009. Eine Analyse mittel “Uncovered Set”
und Schattschneider-Menge zeigt, dass die Prognosen kooperativer Spieltheorie
den gegenwa¨rtigen Politikentscheidungen entsprechen.
Das zweite Kapitel diskutiert Verfahren zur Scha¨tzung der Positionierung von
Parteien im politischem Spektrum. Es zeigt sich, dass die Wahl des Verfahrens
direkten Einfluss auf die gescha¨tzten Gleichgewichtspositionen der Parteien in
einem Modell ra¨umlichen Wettbewerbs hat. Fu¨r identische optimale Position-
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ierung aus Wa¨hlersicht ergibt sich je nach Wahl des Verfahrens Divergenz oder
Konvergenz von der Mitte des Spektrums politischer Pra¨ferenzen.
Untersuchungsgegenstand des dritten Kapitels sind gesetzliche Vorschriften
zur Wahlkampffinanzierung. Im Fokus steht deren Wirksamkeit im Hinblick auf
die Beka¨mpfung von Lobbyismus. Getestet werden diverse Hypothesen, welche
aus dem Valence-Modell abgeleitet wurden. Der empirischen Analyse liegt ein
Querschnittsdatensatz mit Beobachtungen zu 47 La¨ndern zugrunde. Es stellt
sich heraus dass o¨ffentliche Parteienfinanzierung zu Divergenz im Hinblick auf
die strategische Ausrichtung von Parteien fu¨hrt. Ho¨chstbetra¨ge auf individu-
elle Spenden fu¨hren dagegen zu Konvergenz. Diese Ergebnisse fussen auf Un-
terschiede in der vom Wa¨hler wahrgenommen Wertigkeit der Parteien abseits
der politischen Agenda. U¨berraschenderweise zeigt sich auch, dass ein Verbot
von Firmenspenden und die Offenlegung der Parteienfinanzierung zu Divergenz
fu¨hren.
Das vierte und letzte Kapitel befasst sich mit der Analyse eines lokalen Refer-
endums zur freiwilligen Besteuerung in Polen. Zuna¨chst erfolgt eine ausfu¨hrliche
Schilderung dieses Elements direkter Demokratie und mo¨glicher Konsequenzen
auf lokale Fiskalpolitik. Ausgehend von dem hohen Partizipationskosten der
Bu¨rger und der geringen Verfu¨gbarkeit von Informationen argumentieren wir,
dass das lokale Referendum zur freiwilligen Besteuerung nicht zu ho¨herer Beteili-
gung an Bu¨rgerentscheiden auf lokaler Ebene fu¨hrt. Zudem stellt sich heraus, das
lokale Beho¨rden u¨ber eine de facto Monopolmacht im Hinblick auf die politische
Agenda verfu¨gen, welche aus den hohen Kosten fu¨r bu¨rgerliche Initiativen resul-
tiert. In Konsequenz fu¨hrt das betrachtete Referendum nicht zu einer effizienteren
Bereitstellung o¨ffentlicher Gu¨ter, aber dient zur Ausweitung der Bu¨rokratie.
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